

Cash and Small Business Groups for Ugandans and Refugees

 Travis Baseler, Thomas Ginn, Ibrahim Kasirye, Belinda Muya, Andrew Zeitlin

Abstract

Constraints that inhibit small business growth are potentially amplified for groups with limited access to existing business networks like refugees and women. Programs that facilitate intergroup contact, in addition to capital, could potentially raise welfare, especially if incentives are aligned for participants to share information and invest effort in each other's outcomes. In a randomized trial with microentrepreneurs, we vary business grants, inclusion in a mentorship group, the gender and nationality composition of groups, and a "shared fate" component that compensates group members for the success of other members' businesses. We find that grants substantially improve business outcomes for men, women, refugees, and hosts. Combining mentorship with cash has an additional positive effect for refugee men, but a negative effect relative to cash alone for women who run higher-profit firms. Mentors with higher baseline profits significantly improve mentees' business outcomes, while differences across group gender and nationality compositions are small. The shared fate addition worsens early outcomes in aligned groups but does not affect mixed groups.

KEYWORDS

Microentrepreneurship,
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1 Introduction

Microentrepreneurship is a common form of employment for urban residents in lower-income countries, but many small firms yield low profit. Borrowing constraints and a lack of managerial capital may act to constrain business growth (de Mel, McKenzie and Woodruff, 2008, Brooks, Donovan and Johnson, 2018). These constraints are potentially amplified for groups with limited access to existing business networks, such as refugees and women. With refugee populations across the world increasingly hosted in urban areas, the creation of economic opportunities for, and social integration of, these populations is a pressing policy challenge.

Mentorship by an experienced business owner has the potential to grow existing business networks. Mentors may have valuable information to share and can serve as role models to help build confidence. Further, a program intervention may facilitate exchange across groups that would otherwise have few connections, such as across gender or nationality lines. This contact may also increase intergroup social cohesion, a hypothesis studied by social scientists for decades. However, the mentor’s effort is likely difficult for mentees or program facilitators to observe, and the mentor may view the mentees as potential competitors, reducing their incentive to invest in mentorship and share valuable information.

This project tests whether business mentorship improves microenterprise success and social cohesion in Kampala, Uganda, a city that hosts 150,000 refugees. We randomly matched inexperienced microentrepreneurs to four-person mentorship groups consisting of three inexperienced “mentees” and one “mentor” with more business experience who guided the group through a set of weekly, semi-structured meetings for approximately six months. Mentee participants also received business grants of 2,000,000 UGX (about US\$540): a separate treatment arm included only a business grant, allowing us to evaluate the marginal value of the mentorship component. To study the impacts of contact across nationality and gender lines, participants were randomly assigned either to *aligned* groups consisting of members of the same nationality and gender or one of two *heterogeneous* group structures: *cross-nationality* groups consisting of two native and two refugee members of the same gender or *cross-gender* groups consisting of two men and two women of the same nationality. Finally, a random subset of mentorship groups was assigned to a *shared fate* component that compensated all group members for the success of their partners’ businesses, measured by whether the business was operational at three fixed points spanning the mentorship program. The shared fate arm may better align incentives within groups by giving participants a stake in the each others’ success, especially in heterogeneous groups where a lack of familiarity may inhibit non-financial incentives to cooperate.

We find that all treatment arms substantially improve business openness and profit over

one year. Averaging across all mentorship group structures, the impacts of assignment to a mentorship group on business outcomes are similar to impacts of the business grant alone, implying that the marginal value of mentorship is statistically zero on average. However, there is considerable heterogeneity in the added benefit of mentorship: refugee men experience positive added benefits, while the added effect women is negative for women with higher profits. The shared fate addition worsens early outcomes in aligned groups but does not affect mixed groups. While cash significantly affects social cohesion outcomes among Ugandans, we find no consistent evidence of significant changes in inter-group attitudes or social cohesion resulting from heterogeneous mentorship relative to aligned mentorship.

These findings improve our understanding of three fundamental constraints to refugees’ livelihoods and well-being: physical capital, human capital, and social capital. The large impacts of cash transfers on business outcomes and well-being measures indicate that physical capital constraints are inhibiting small business growth. Mentorship groups and business management training are designed to increase human capital through the provision of business-related skills and knowledge. Our finding that the impacts of business mentorship are highly heterogeneous along both mentee and mentor characteristics implies that screening in more profitable mentors would likely improve business mentorship programs. Finally, heterogeneous mentorship groups are designed to alleviate a social capital constraint, strengthening “weak ties,” to test whether deepening the embeddedness of refugees in their host communities is valuable for business success.

Our study relates closely to work on business networks (Brooks, Donovan and Johnson, 2018, Cai and Szeidl, 2018, Fafchamps and Quinn, 2018, Loiacono and Silva-Vargas, 2023) and managerial capital (Bloom and Van Reenen, 2007, Bloom et al., 2013). It also relates to work on the graduation model, where programs testing group-based coaching have shown promising effects, including among refugees in rural Uganda (Brune et al., 2023). We contribute to this literature by varying the composition of the groups to test whether expanding business networks across demographic groups can leverage the “strength of weak ties” to improve business performance and can affect social cohesion (Baseler et al., 2023b). Finally, this work relates to a vast literature on the use of financial incentives to encourage the transmission of human capital (e.g., Leaver et al., 2021) and on the broader impacts of aligning financial instruments and incentives across different groups (Jha and Shayo, 2019).

A large literature studies the role of intergroup contact in the formation of attitudes, following the contact hypothesis as formulated in Allport (1954). Contact can reduce prejudice when it is collaborative in nature (Mousa, 2020, Lowe, 2021, Corno, La Ferrara and Burns, 2022): see Paluck, Green and Green (2019) for a meta-analysis. In Kampala, Loiacono and Silva-Vargas (2023) find that Ugandan business owners randomly offered a subsidized

refugee employee for one week employ more refugees eight months later. However, [Enos and Gidron \(2018\)](#) finds few effects of contact among Israel’s Jewish citizens toward Palestinians, and [Zhou and Lyall \(2022\)](#) finds similar null results among Afghan hosts toward internally displaced people.

2 Background

In Uganda, as in much of sub-Saharan Africa, self-employment in the informal sector is the most common form of work ([O’Higgins, Shawa and Sossa, 2020](#)). Informal firms are typically small, earning low profits and including no more than a few employees: the typical firm in our sample earns about \$42 per month. Common types of microenterprises include hair salons, retail outlets, tailoring shops.

For refugees, Uganda is one of the world’s most inclusive hosting environments ([Ginn et al., 2022](#)). Refugees are allowed to live outside of the rural settlements, but urban residence means foregoing most assistance like food rations. Out of 1.6 million refugees in Uganda, approximately 150,000 live in Kampala ([UNHCR, 2024](#)). Refugees are allowed to start businesses if they obtain the same permits that Ugandans are required to hold and are able to hold formal jobs. The main refugee nationalities in Kampala are Congolese, Rwandans, Somalis, Burundians, Ethiopians, Eritreans, Sudanese, and South Sudanese, all of which are included in our sample.

3 Experimental Design

We designed seven treatment arms to test whether group mentorship and cash grants can relieve constraints facing small business owners in Kampala, Uganda.

3.1 Sample

The full sample consists of 2,000 inexperienced or prospective micro-entrepreneurs, denoted as the “main” sample, and 600 mentors living in Kampala, Uganda. The sample is balanced on gender and refugee status and selected from a larger registration list to accommodate this balance and the demographics needed for the randomization, discussed below. Most participants in the main sample are between 18 and 35 years old, have fewer than six years of business experience, and want to spend at least 20 hours per week on business in the near future. Mentors are at least 25 years old and were judged by program staff to have the interpersonal and business skills necessary to be a mentor. All participants must speak either English or Luganda at a conversational level so that they could potentially be randomized into a mixed nationality group. Additionally, all sampled participants were willing to spend three hours each week for six months on the program, including the potential for group

meetings or surveys.

3.2 Interventions

Our interventions were implemented by the International Rescue Committee (IRC), a global non-governmental organization which operates in countries that host refugees, including Uganda. Individuals in our main sample were randomly assigned to receive a cash grant, a cash grant and a mentorship group, or to a control arm.

Cash Grants. All treated individuals in the main sample received a cash grant of US \$540 (2,000,000 UGX) approximately six weeks after the programs began.¹ The grant was labeled as intended for business purposes, but there was no spending oversight. The six-week window between program launch and cash transfer was intended to provide the groups enough time to build trust and learn from each other how to invest the money and the cash arm enough time to plan their spending. Mentorship groups were not expected to invest in joint projects and were reminded that the grant is theirs individually to invest as they want. The mentors received a grant of US \$270, also paid in full after six weeks, and an additional US \$54 at the end of the program. After two weeks, each treatment arm was given a transport stipend to cover potential program travel over the six months duration: US \$4 for the cash arm, US \$54 for the main sample assigned a mentorship group, and US \$65 for treated mentors.

Mentorship Groups. Mentorship groups consisted of three mentees from the main sample and one mentor. Group members met at an initial launch event and then were asked to meet once per week for six months at a convenient time and location. Handbooks for mentorship groups provided a suggested curriculum modeled after the IRC’s “Learn 2 Earn” classroom business training. The suggested curriculum included business topics and exercises, as well as ice-breaker questions to learn about group members personally. The mentorship bundle additionally included short animated videos which could be sent and viewed on smartphones.² In addition to the weekly group meetings, mentors met once per month with each other for the first four months of the program to discuss progress and challenges with the groups in meetings facilitated by the IRC.

Group Composition: Gender and Nationality. Mentorship groups were formed in three possible configurations: *aligned* groups consisting of four individuals of the same nationality and gender, *cross-gender* groups consisting of two men and two women of the same nationality, and *cross-nationality* groups consisting of two Ugandans and two refugees of the

¹All Ugandan Shilling (UGX) amounts are reported in US Dollars at an exchange rate of 1 USD = 3,703 UGX.

²The business training videos can be viewed at https://www.youtube.com/playlist?list=PL5KpU_czGn__NpQLFEuKCAZ6zpFLyd8Vw.

same gender.

Performance-Based Incentives. All treatment arms included performance-based financial incentives. Each participant with an open business that was reported to the IRC was entered into a lottery at three fixed points: 2, 4, and 6 months from program launch. For all lottery winners, business openness spot-checked in-person by IRC staff.³ By the third lottery, 69% of participants reported a business to the IRC and were entered into the lottery. Forty-seven percent of entrants (33% of each treatment arm in total) won. Winners received US \$20 each round.

“Shared Fate” Incentives. We randomly assigned some mentorship groups to receive payouts for every mentee in their group who won the lottery. This design gives group members “skin in the game” with respect to others’ outcomes, and is motivated by our hypothesis that such “shared fate” financial incentives may help groups overcome barriers created by a lack of familiarity, which may be pronounced in heterogeneous groups. To incentivize effort by mentors, mentors of winning businesses received US \$27 each round. In each round, all participants received an SMS announcing the total group winnings and which members won for the group.⁴ We refer to mentorship groups receiving these group-based incentives as *shared fate mentorship* groups, and groups receiving only individual-based incentives as *basic mentorship* groups.⁵ These two incentive designs are fully interacted with the three possible demographic configurations, forming six mentorship arms in total.

Control. The control group received a cash grant 18 months after the program launched. At the time of registration, participants were informed that some transfers would be delayed, which would be decided by a computer. The control group was then called while the programs were launching to inform them of the delay. The 24-month survey was collected after the control group received a transfer and is therefore analyzed separately.

Treatment Roll-Out. Individuals assigned to a treatment group were invited to a central location between July 2022 and February 2023 to launch the program. Cash only, basic mentorship, and shared fate mentorship treatment arms were invited on separate days to

³During spot checks, staff were instructed to confirm that the business was operational either directly by verifying that the participant or business capital was present at the business location, or indirectly by checking nearby business owners’ familiarity with the participant’s business.

⁴A lottery-based design reduces monitoring costs—because only winners need to be verified—and reduces the risk of group tension, as not winning the lottery can be attributed to chance.

⁵The verification of business openness, spot-checks, timing, and amounts for the winners were the same in the cash, basic mentorship, and shared fate groups. To equate expected payouts across treatment arms, individuals assigned to cash only or basic mentorship received a separate, unannounced lump-sum transfer of US \$41 three months after the launch event. Mentors in the basic mentorship arm also received fixed payments of US \$20 to coincide with the mentees’ lotteries at 2 and 4 months, in addition to the US \$54 after six months, the end of the program.

avoid confusion about the lottery structures. Each launch day included a mix of genders, nationalities, and group compositions that were visible to other participants. At the event, IRC staff introduced the program components with a video and discussion, and mentorship groups met for the first time when applicable. Each participant in the treatment arms received a handbook that includes a description of the program, explanation of the lottery, program timeline, information on the IRC, and consent forms. Handbooks for mentorship arms also included a code of conduct and mentorship meeting guides, discussed below.⁶ The program design was informed by piloting described in Baseler et al. (2024).

Information About Refugees and Aid-Sharing The program video and handbook included basic information about refugees in Uganda, following the design of Baseler et al. (2023b). Baseler et al. (2023b) finds that information delivered to Ugandans about a national policy that requires international aid for refugees to be partly shared with Ugandans significantly changes attitudes toward refugees. Cross-nationality mentorship groups thus estimate the effects of inter-group contact beyond effects from the information provided in this script. The handbook notes:

The IRC’s mission is to support refugees and also the communities that host them. Refugees are people who do not feel safe in their home countries...The IRC started the Re:Build program because refugees live here in Kampala, and we want both refugees and Ugandans who live in Kampala to benefit. Refugees and Ugandans are participating in this program, both as mentors and mentees... Overall, this project is part of the international donations that are shared between refugees and hosts in Uganda. In Uganda, more than 30% of foreign donations for refugees go to supporting Ugandans.

3.3 Experimental Assignment and Balance

Assignment of sampled individuals to treatment proceeded as follows. First, individuals were recruited to participate in the study as part of a *stratum*. Each stratum consisted of 40 individuals from the same (or adjacent) neighborhoods, with half of its constituents female, and all from the same nationality; strata comprised 12 mentors and 28 mentees. Strata were *paired* so that each refugee stratum was matched with a stratum of Ugandans, with pairing undertaken to minimize the average distance between the neighborhoods of paired strata in the sample.

⁶The full participant handbooks are available at www.rebuild.rescue.org/rct-participant-handbook.

This configuration ensured that each strata pair contained sufficient numbers to create all possible permutations of the treatments, with individuals in nationality-misaligned mentorship groups paired with those from the opposing stratum. To address integer constraints, strata pairs were assigned to one of two treatment configurations in a first-stage randomization, and then individuals were assigned to the resulting treatments within these blocks in a second stage.

We generated 2,000 such randomizations that passed a constraint of basic balance on IRC registration data. The final treatment assignment was chosen by simple randomization from within these “feasible” randomizations.

[Table B1](#) shows the results of the assignment in terms of the resulting balance on baseline economic and social outcomes, respectively. The results are consistent with successful randomization. Stratification provides effectively perfect balance by gender and refugee status.

4 Empirical Setup

4.1 Data

Our main data come from five rounds of in-person surveys: a baseline and follow-ups every three months, approximately 3, 6, 9, and 12 months after the launch event. We also surveyed participants after 24 months, which was after the control group received cash grants and therefore analyzed separately. The main and mentor samples were surveyed in all rounds. Surveys were conducted by an independent survey firm, and respondents were regularly reminded that their answers would not be shared with the IRC to facilitate true reporting of social and business outcomes. Attrition is reported in [Table B2](#). Overall, 96% of the main sample was surveyed at least once between the 3- and 12-month surveys, with no significant differences across arms ($p = 0.85$ from joint F-test). Pooling the 3 to 12-month rounds, the control group was more likely to respond than treatment groups ($p = 0.1$). Observations are therefore weighted in the estimating equation using inverse probability weights. The weights are generated as a function of treatments and candidate baseline covariates using a lasso.

We also utilize data collected by the IRC: demographic information at registration, attendance at launch events, a survey collected if the participant’s business was verified for eligibility into the lottery, and whether the lottery winners were successfully spot-checked. We additionally conducted 40 qualitative interviews in June 2023, about 10 months after the program launched for the majority of participants.

4.2 Outcomes

The main specifications for economic outcomes include only the main sample, excluding mentors. Continuous monetary outcomes like profit, revenue, and capital are winsorized at 1st and 99th percentile within survey rounds and treatment arms. If a respondent does not have an open business, these outcomes are included as 0. We otherwise do not impute missing values for outcome variables but do impute missing values for control variables using the baseline mean.

The main specifications for social outcomes include both the main and mentor samples and are presented separately for Ugandans and refugees. Likert scales and other categorical variables are transformed into binary measures split around the median response, with the median resolved toward the smaller group. “Don’t know” and other missing values are not included.

Outcomes are grouped in pre-specified domains and combined into indices following [Anderson \(2008\)](#). Index components with 90% or more of respondents providing a directionally positive response (after transformation from Likert to binary) in the control group are excluded. Results on the pre-specified domains and the component variables are presented in [Appendix C](#).

4.3 Baseline Summary Statistics

[Table 1](#) presents summary statistics at baseline. Business and household outcomes among Ugandans and refugees in our sample are similar. These outcomes include owning a business, profits, capital, business practices, household earnings, and meals skipped. Refugees with a business are more likely to report that it is registered with the Ugandan government. The differences among men and women in our sample are more significant, as men report higher profits, business capital, and household earnings. As expected, mentors report significantly larger businesses in terms of profits and capital, as well as higher household earnings and fewer meals skipped.

Table 1: Baseline Summary Statistics

	<i>Main Sample</i>				<i>Mentors</i>	
	Ugandan Men	Refugee Men	Ugandan Women	Refugee Women	All	All
Age	28.1 (5.8)	28.3 (7.9)	30.2 (6.8)	28.8 (7.7)	28.8 (7.2)	43.0 (6.8)
Years of Education	12.3 (3.5)	13.6 (3.5)	11.0 (3.8)	12.2 (3.9)	12.3 (3.8)	11.4 (4.3)
Years of Experience	4.1 (4.0)	3.6 (4.0)	3.5 (3.7)	3.7 (4.3)	3.7 (4.0)	8.2 (7.8)
Owns Business (%)	70.9 (45.4)	65.3 (47.6)	74.5 (43.6)	69.2 (46.2)	70.0 (45.8)	86.5 (34.2)
Profits (USD / 30 Days)	32.4 (51.8)	36.7 (57.4)	22.2 (37.0)	22.5 (41.4)	28.4 (48.0)	58.6 (102.2)
Business Capital (USD)	429.1 (802.7)	447.0 (804.9)	291.6 (649.4)	317.5 (645.5)	371.3 (732.4)	764.5 (1527.2)
Business Registered (%)	14.7 (35.4)	23.4 (42.4)	8.6 (28.1)	18.0 (38.5)	15.9 (36.6)	25.9 (43.8)
Hours Worked on Businesses (7 Days)	54.5 (32.1)	49.6 (26.1)	53.4 (31.7)	43.5 (28.0)	50.3 (30.0)	53.8 (30.6)
Business Practice Score (/11)	7.9 (2.6)	8.4 (2.1)	8.0 (2.3)	8.1 (2.5)	8.1 (2.4)	8.0 (2.5)
Household Earnings (USD / 30 Days)	74.1 (78.7)	65.1 (84.1)	51.3 (64.4)	48.8 (73.1)	59.8 (76.1)	89.1 (156.8)
Household Size	4.4 (2.5)	5.0 (3.4)	5.1 (2.3)	5.8 (3.0)	5.1 (2.9)	6.1 (2.8)
Days With Skipped Meals (Last 7)	1.1 (1.6)	1.1 (1.6)	1.3 (1.8)	1.2 (1.7)	1.2 (1.7)	1.0 (1.8)
Months Unable to Pay Rent (Last 3)	1.3 (1.0)	1.1 (1.0)	1.3 (1.1)	1.4 (1.0)	1.3 (1.0)	1.2 (1.1)
Number of Observations	500	500	500	500	2,000	600

An observation is a surveyed respondent at baseline. Standard deviations are in parentheses.

Table 2 reports baseline business networks across demographics. Respondents are asked for up to three people they talk to most about business: Ugandans report more contacts overall (1.96 to 1.28) and more contacts with Ugandans (1.81 to 0.26). Refugees report one other refugee on average, while the mean for Ugandans listing refugees among contacts is 0.12. As with the comparison between refugees and hosts, business networks along this measure are segmented along demographic lines. Men report slightly more contacts overall, and more contacts among men, while women report more contacts among women.

4.4 Specification

As set out in our pre-analysis plan (Baseler et al., 2023a), the starting point for all analysis of intent-to-treat effects is an ANCOVA specification of the form

Table 2: Contacts You Would Ask for Advice or Partner With

	Ugandan Men	Ugandan Women	Refugee Men	Refugee Women
Num. Listed	2.1	1.9	1.4	1.2
Listed No Contacts (%)	15	18	37	44
Listed Ug Male (%)	74	40	17	4
Listed Ug Female (%)	36	69	5	12
Listed Ref Male (%)	7	4	46	21
Listed Ref Female (%)	2	6	24	41
Observations	499	499	499	500

$$(1) \quad y_{ist} = \alpha \text{Cash}_{is} + \sum_j \beta_j \text{Mentorship}_{isj} + \gamma y_{i0} + \delta M_{i0} + X_{is0} \Pi + \theta_t + \tau d_{ist} + \kappa_s + e_{ist}$$

where y_{ist} is an outcome for individual i in randomization stratum s measured at time t , with $t = 0$ corresponding to baseline (pre-treatment) values; Cash_{is} is a dummy equal to 1 if individual i was assigned to any treatment arm (all of which received a cash grant); Mentorship_{isj} is a set of six treatment assignment dummies indicating whether individual i was assigned to basic aligned mentorship, basic cross-gender mentorship, basic cross-nationality mentorship, shared fate aligned mentorship, shared fate cross-gender mentorship, or shared fate cross-nationality mentorship, or some aggregation of those dummies; M_{i0} is a dummy equal to 1 if y_{i0} is missing; X_{is0} is a vector of possible controls chosen through double lasso regression; θ_t and κ_s are survey-round and randomization-stratum fixed effects respectively; and e_{ist} is an error term. Given that the roll-out period meant that there is potentially meaningful variation in survey timing even with a follow-up round and randomization stratum (albeit uncorrelated with treatment), we further control for survey timing with fixed effects for the month of the survey, d_{ist} . α estimates the average intent-to-treat impact of the cash grant on y_{ist} relative to the control group, pooling across survey rounds, and conditional on a set of baseline fixed effects and controls. β_j estimates the analogous impact of mentorship group j relative to cash; the impact of mentorship relative to control is given by $\alpha + \beta_j$. Throughout this paper, we discuss the impacts of mentorship compared to cash only—rather than mentorship compared to control—unless otherwise noted.

5 Results: Grants and Mentorship

5.1 Mentorship Meetings

Respondents in mentorship arms report meeting with their group 2.6 times per month on average in the first six months, when the IRC asked groups to meet. In the subsequent six months after the program concluded, respondents reported one meeting per month on average. Outside of group meetings, mentees reported 10.5 conversations per month with other group members in the first six months and 6 conversations per month in months 6 to 12. Most mentees understood their lottery payouts: in the 6-month survey, 68% correctly identified whether individuals or everyone in their group wins from lottery selections.

5.2 Business Outcomes

Table 3 displays impacts on selected outcomes estimated using Equation (1), covering the main sample between 3 and 12 months after the program launched. Over this period, the average effects of cash grants are large and significant. The grant increases business ownership by 15 percentage points (pp) on a control base of 72% ($p < 0.01$) and average profits by \$23 per month on a base of \$42 (effect size = 55%; $p < 0.01$). Among those without a business at baseline, grants more than double the likelihood of business ownership (**Table A1**, 41 pp. on a base of 31 pp., $p < 0.01$) and increase profits by \$38 per month on average on a base of \$14 ($p < 0.01$). The grants increase the stock of business capital by an average of \$373, representing 69% of the \$540 grant and more than doubling the control mean of \$363 ($p < 0.01$).

The effects of cash are large within all four demographics: Ugandan men, Ugandan women, refugee men, and refugee women. Ugandan men experience the highest returns in monthly profits (\$27, $p < 0.05$), business ownership (20 pp., $p < 0.01$), and business capital (\$511, $p < 0.01$), while effects for Ugandan women of \$19 on profits ($p < 0.05$) and \$271 on capital ($p < 0.01$) are generally lowest but still significant. Refugee men are the only demographic to expand their business network when receiving cash, reporting 0.2 more contacts on a base of 1.45 (effect size = 14%; $p < 0.1$). Overall, returns for refugees are similar as returns for Ugandans, suggesting the barriers that refugees face in this context do not prohibit productive investments in line with hosts.

There is also notable heterogeneity across the distribution of profits and over time. The top panel of **Figure 1** presents the effects of the cash grants at different levels of profit as estimated by quantile regressions. The effect of the grants for men at the median is \$21 ($p < 0.01$) and for women is \$12 ($p < 0.01$). The returns are lowest—estimated at 0—below

Table 3: Business Outcomes

<i>A. Owns Business</i>	All	Ugandan Men	Refugee Men	Ugandan Women	Refugee Women
Any Cash	0.15*** (0.02)	0.20*** (0.04)	0.12*** (0.04)	0.14*** (0.04)	0.16*** (0.04)
Any Mentorship	0.02 (0.02)	0.03 (0.03)	0.04 (0.04)	-0.02 (0.02)	0.03 (0.03)
Observations	6,890	1,747	1,630	1,799	1,714
Control Mean	0.72	0.71	0.71	0.78	0.68
<i>B. Business Profits (USD, 30 Days)</i>	All	Ug. Men	Ref. Men	Ug. Wm.	Ref. Wm.
Any Cash	23.23*** (5.14)	26.68** (11.43)	22.65** (10.95)	19.29** (9.37)	21.93*** (8.48)
Any Mentorship	1.71 (5.01)	4.23 (10.30)	25.87** (11.84)	-6.15 (8.11)	-11.47 (8.69)
Control Mean	42.23	47.64	46.78	41.07	33.20
<i>C. Business Capital (USD)</i>	All	Ug. Men	Ref. Men	Ug. Wm.	Ref. Wm.
Any Cash	372.50*** (53.54)	511.11*** (103.00)	376.97*** (128.91)	271.36*** (79.41)	316.11*** (71.73)
Any Mentorship	-63.24 (54.44)	-21.19 (100.75)	-0.77 (132.66)	-44.88 (76.93)	-129.35* (71.54)
Control Mean	362.54	383.49	542.85	329.59	198.50
<i>D. Business Contacts (Max 3)</i>	All	Ug. Men	Ref. Men	Ug. Wm.	Ref. Wm.
Any Cash	0.06 (0.05)	0.10 (0.09)	0.20* (0.12)	-0.05 (0.09)	0.04 (0.11)
Any Mentorship	-0.01 (0.04)	-0.06 (0.07)	0.04 (0.09)	-0.01 (0.08)	0.03 (0.09)
Control Mean	1.85	2.13	1.45	2.21	1.53

An observation is a surveyed respondent, with one per post-baseline survey round. Results estimated through ANCOVA regression with baseline controls selected through double-lasso. Standard errors clustered at the individual level in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

the 20th percentile and highest above the 75th percentile for both genders. The effects of cash evolve differently over time for men and women, as shown in [Figure 2](#). The effects on profits for Ugandan men peak around eight months after the cash is distributed and are similar in the next survey round three months later. We cannot estimate the effects of cash beyond twelve months, when the control group was given cash. Effects for refugee men are sustained through the 3rd survey round and fall after. For women, on the other hand, effects are largest in the first six months, especially Ugandan women. The effects on profits after six months for women are not statistically different from zero.

The additional average impact of mentorship—pooling across all mentorship configura-

tions, which we refer to as *any mentorship*—on business outcomes is small and statistically insignificant. The average null effects shown in Table 3 of any mentorship on business ownership (2 pp.), profits (\$2), capital (−\$63), and contacts (−0.01), however, mask important differences across demographic groups. Mentorship increases profits for refugee men by \$26 ($p < 0.05$), concentrated in the middle of the distribution. Figure 2 shows the effects of mentorship lagged the effects of cash, emerging after the three-month survey round, and are largest after 12 months. The effects are not sustained, however, as the difference with the cash only group is insignificant after two years. Mentorship is not driven by additional capital investment or expansion of networks.


For women, the effect of any mentorship is statistically insignificant but marginally negative relative to cash alone. Both Ugandan and refugee women assigned to mentorship groups have lower profits and capital than cash only arms. We estimate the effect of mentorship is close to 0 for most women, up to the 75th percentile. For the 25% most profitable women-owned businesses, however, mentorship inhibits much of the growth experienced in the cash only arm. Figure 2 shows the initial positive response experienced by cash only is smaller for women in mentorship groups and shows no evidence of effects emerging after a lag.

5.3 Well-Being Outcomes

Mirroring the effects on businesses, the grant also significantly affects household and psychological well-being outcomes. The grant’s effect on households’ total earnings is slightly larger on average than the effect on the recipient’s business profits, including at least \$11 more per month for male participants, suggesting the grant or profits generated from it were also invested in other productive household outlets. For refugee men, mentorship increased their household earnings by an additional \$24 ($p < 0.1$), the same magnitude as the impact on business profits. Households with female refugee grant recipients also earned slightly more than the effect on business profits alone, while the effect on household earnings for Ugandan women is statistically insignificant. For these households, it’s possible the business income replaced wage income or profits were applied to other uses, which is under further study.

Table 4 also presents estimated impacts on food security and the overall household well-being index. Cash decreases the number of days with at least one family member skipping a meal by 0.38 days (effect size = 38%, $p < 0.01$). The largest effects are for Ugandan women, where food insecurity among control is highest, and the lowest effects are for refugee women, where food insecurity is lowest. Overall, the household well-being index, which includes household earnings, food security, ability to pay rent, educational, and emergency expenses,

Figure 1: Effects By Quantiles



The plot presents results from quantile regressions using the *rqr* STATA commands (Borgen, Haupt and Wiborg, 2021). The specification follows Equation (1) using 3- to 12-month survey rounds but does not select baseline controls X_{is0} .


etc., increases by 0.44 standard deviations (sd., $p < 0.01$). This effect persists for at least 12 months for both men and women, suggesting that business profits are not households' only source for medium-term returns from the grant.

Finally, cash grants increase our psychological well-being index by 0.26 standard deviations ($p < 0.01$). This includes components on feeling happy, calm, and sad which are reported in Tables C17 and C18 for men and women, respectively. All pre-specified outcomes, disaggregated by gender, are presented in Appendix C.

6 Results: Group Composition and Incentives

We experimentally varied the group composition and incentive structure to study the effects of diversity within the groups. Table 5 estimates the effects of group composition on monthly profits using Equation (1) within the main sample assigned to mentorship up to one year after the program. Panel A shows no average differences across group structures. There is no evidence of an average effect of the shared fate incentive ($p = 0.81$), the mixed nationality

Figure 2: Effects Over Time



Results are from Equation (1) estimated within each survey round, with the control as the omitted category.

group compared to an aligned group ($p = 0.35$), or the mixed gender groups ($p = 0.42$).

While the effects are null on average over 12 months, group composition and incentives had significant effects on outcomes over the six months of the program, with the incentives in place and the mentors committed to organize weekly meetings. Table 6 shows business and group satisfaction outcomes through the first two survey rounds. The group structure with the most negative outcomes through the program duration, across business and group satisfaction outcomes, is the aligned groups with the shared fate component. After 6 months, profits in these groups are lower than other structures (\$21 lower than basic aligned groups, $p < 0.05$), and other outcomes suggest the group-level incentive worsened group dynamics. Shared fate aligned groups are 8 pp. less likely to feel that the group listens to their questions ($p < 0.05$) and that all group members are working hard ($p < 0.05$). We also find less positive-sum beliefs: shared fate aligned mentees are 6 pp. less likely ($p < 0.1$) to feel that they benefit when their group members succeed. Incentives appear to undermine group cohesion on average when group members are the same gender and nationality.

However, negative effects of incentives are overcome within mixed nationality and mixed

Table 4: Well-Being Outcomes

		Ugandan Men	Refugee Men	Ugandan Women	Refugee Women
<i>A. Household Earnings (USD, 30 Days)</i>					
Any Cash	28.18*** (7.00)	41.57*** (14.43)	34.07*** (12.66)	4.25 (15.33)	25.99** (12.03)
Any Mentorship	-0.49 (6.23)	-2.41 (13.07)	24.10* (13.64)	-6.92 (11.40)	-13.78 (10.72)
Observations	6,890	1,747	1,630	1,799	1,714
Control Mean	88.10	98.40	81.83	102.42	67.59
<i>B. Days With Skipped Meals (Last 7)</i>					
	All	Ug. Men	Ref. Men	Ug. Wm.	Ref. Wm.
Any Cash	-0.38*** (0.08)	-0.37*** (0.13)	-0.47*** (0.15)	-0.63*** (0.17)	-0.03 (0.14)
Any Mentorship	0.02 (0.05)	0.02 (0.07)	-0.02 (0.10)	0.14 (0.11)	-0.12 (0.11)
Control Mean	1.00	0.86	1.11	1.23	0.78
<i>C. Household Well-Being Index</i>					
	All	Ug. Men	Ref. Men	Ug. Wm.	Ref. Wm.
Any Cash	0.44*** (0.05)	0.45*** (0.11)	0.44*** (0.10)	0.53*** (0.10)	0.27*** (0.10)
Any Mentorship	-0.06 (0.04)	-0.03 (0.09)	0.01 (0.10)	-0.11 (0.07)	-0.02 (0.07)
Control Mean	-0.00	0.13	0.07	-0.17	-0.02
<i>D. Psychological Well-Being Index</i>					
	All	Ug. Men	Ref. Men	Ug. Wm.	Ref. Wm.
Any Cash	0.26*** (0.05)	0.35*** (0.09)	0.22** (0.10)	0.33*** (0.09)	0.27*** (0.09)
Any Mentorship	-0.01 (0.04)	-0.04 (0.08)	-0.01 (0.08)	-0.04 (0.07)	-0.04 (0.08)
Control Mean	0.02	0.03	0.12	-0.00	-0.07

An observation is a surveyed respondent, with one per post-baseline survey round. Results estimated through ANCOVA regression with baseline controls selected through double-lasso. Standard errors clustered at the individual level in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

gender groups. Profits, listening to questions, and perceptions of whether the group is working hard are close to the basic aligned groups in the mixed gender and mixed nationality groups with the shared fate incentives. Group members in shared fate mixed nationality are more likely than basic aligned groups to feel that they benefit when their group members succeed ($p < 0.05$).

This pattern is consistent with our motivation for the shared fate component, that financial incentives may substitute for group characteristics that are plausibly weaker on average in heterogeneous groups at baseline, such as comfort and familiarity with other group members. Business segmentation by gender and nationality at the industry level implies that

Table 5: Mentorship Group Composition

<i>A. Business Profits (USD, 30 Days)</i>	All	Ugandan Men	Refugee Men	Ugandan Women	Refugee Women
Basic - Mixed Gender	1.98 (8.83)	-15.63 (17.76)	7.70 (23.97)	-1.30 (13.49)	11.74 (13.31)
Basic - Mixed Nat.	2.03 (8.40)	14.65 (17.70)	-2.97 (21.85)	-4.98 (12.41)	7.17 (11.61)
Shared Fate - Aligned	-8.73 (8.81)	-18.85 (19.63)	-10.52 (28.52)	0.05 (11.23)	5.71 (11.86)
Shared Fate - Mixed Gender	3.30 (9.76)	-14.37 (18.58)	15.01 (26.08)	7.78 (18.24)	4.59 (12.21)
Shared Fate - Mixed Nat.	5.05 (9.38)	10.61 (20.42)	-10.53 (22.06)	1.72 (13.48)	5.21 (15.19)
Aligned = Mixed Nat.	0.35	0.20	0.88	0.83	0.66
Aligned = Mixed Gender	0.42	0.81	0.45	0.88	0.51
Basic = Shared Fate	0.81	0.55	0.79	0.55	0.94
Nat DiD	0.36	0.62	0.94	0.70	0.68
Gender DiD	0.46	0.46	0.64	0.67	0.48
<i>B. Business Profits (USD, 30 Days)</i>	All	Ug. Men	Ref. Men	Ug. Wm.	Ref. Wm.
Male Mentor - Mixed Gender	18.87* (9.73)	8.49 (17.95)	60.17 (38.25)	15.19 (13.63)	6.80 (10.38)
Female Mentor - Mixed Gender	-7.25 (7.22)	-8.22 (14.49)	-9.95 (15.52)	-22.25* (12.24)	4.55 (12.34)
Ugandan Mentor - Mixed Nat.	9.65 (8.58)	51.77** (25.44)	3.27 (18.51)	-5.89 (12.72)	-2.48 (10.75)
Refugee Mentor - Mixed Nat.	4.09 (7.91)	0.53 (14.14)	-10.96 (21.20)	0.63 (10.66)	18.85 (14.57)
<i>C. Business Profits (USD, 30 Days)</i>	All	Ug. Men	Ref. Men	Ug. Wm.	Ref. Wm.
<u><i>Mentor Baseline Characteristics:</i></u>					
Different Gender	-5.84 (6.46)	-15.51 (13.99)	-20.72 (15.28)	16.57 (12.10)	1.27 (9.47)
Different Nationality	-3.25 (6.66)	-9.07 (14.09)	-16.99 (17.85)	9.66 (9.22)	-20.36** (9.79)
Above Median Profit	19.07*** (5.71)	25.24** (11.29)	17.41 (15.01)	11.90 (9.32)	24.08*** (8.37)
Above Median Experience	-0.24 (5.70)	-15.27 (11.50)	-9.46 (13.78)	18.77** (9.46)	-5.15 (7.75)
Above Median Practices	4.26 (5.94)	-17.18 (12.02)	30.21* (16.43)	13.35 (9.69)	-4.88 (7.57)
Above Median Education	-11.84** (6.00)	-0.30 (12.47)	-2.85 (17.20)	-20.59** (10.47)	-17.28** (8.75)
Highest Subjective Assessment	-7.34 (5.67)	-19.95* (10.76)	-17.59 (14.49)	-2.52 (7.37)	0.03 (7.46)
Observations	4,111	1,040	973	1,082	1,016
Sample Mean	67.17	79.45	89.87	50.75	50.36

An observation is a surveyed respondent, with one per post-baseline survey round. Results estimated through ANCOVA regression with baseline controls selected through double-lasso. Standard errors clustered at the individual level in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table 6: Group Outcomes During Program (6 Months)

	All				Ugandans	Refugees
	Business Profits	Group Listens to Questions	Group Working Hard	When Group Succeeds, I Benefit	When Refs Succeed, Ug. Benefit	When Ug. Succeed, Refs Benefit
Basic - Mixed Gender	-10.20 (9.71)	-0.02 (0.02)	-0.03 (0.03)	-0.04 (0.03)	-0.04 (0.04)	-0.00 (0.05)
Basic - Mixed Nat.	-9.24 (9.21)	-0.01 (0.03)	-0.03 (0.03)	-0.00 (0.03)	-0.01 (0.04)	-0.03 (0.05)
Shared Fate - Aligned	-21.08** (9.32)	-0.08** (0.03)	-0.09*** (0.04)	-0.06* (0.04)	-0.07 (0.05)	-0.09 (0.06)
Shared Fate - Mixed Gender	-2.18 (10.61)	-0.00 (0.03)	-0.03 (0.03)	0.03 (0.04)	-0.04 (0.04)	-0.00 (0.06)
Shared Fate - Mixed Nat.	-4.67 (10.14)	0.02 (0.03)	-0.00 (0.03)	0.07** (0.03)	0.08* (0.04)	0.03 (0.05)
Observations	2,091	2,045	2,045	2,045	1,065	1,026
Sample Mean	65.49	0.87	0.80	0.73	0.77	0.46
Aligned = Mixed Nat.	0.99	0.13	0.74	0.10	0.13	0.54
Aligned = Mixed Gender	0.99	0.55	0.93	0.73	0.56	0.60
Basic = Shared Fate	0.53	0.57	0.24	0.22	0.75	0.82
Nat DiD	0.05	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.02	0.07
Gender DiD	0.04	0.03	0.08	0.02	0.26	0.28

An observation is a surveyed respondent, with one per post-baseline survey round. Results estimated through ANCOVA regression with baseline controls selected through double-lasso. Standard errors clustered at the individual level in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

business owners will typically have more experience working with members of their same nationality or gender. To the extent that this lack of experience acts as an impediment to positive group dynamics, we should expect to see worse dynamics in heterogeneous mentorship groups. If the shared fate addition substitutes for the initial characteristics that are stronger in aligned groups, we should expect shared fate to improve dynamics within heterogeneous groups.

Panel B of Table 5 pools across basic and shared fate models while disaggregating by the mentor’s demographic. In order to estimate the effect of the mentor’s gender and nationality, the aligned groups are our preferred benchmark. To estimate the effect of a male mentor on female mentees, for instance, we compare the effect of mixed gender groups with a male mentor to the aligned groups. This compares groups with 3 female mentees and a female mentor to groups with 2 female mentees, one male mentee, and a male mentor.⁷ This yields

⁷This does not isolate the effect of the mentor’s demographic entirely. In addition to the mentor’s demographic, the comparison also changes one mentee’s demographic, which is bundled in the estimate. We are working on parsing these effects using data on bilateral relationships within groups.

a positive but statistically insignificant effect of male mentors for female mentees, and a negative but insignificant effect of female mentors for male mentees. The effects of Ugandan mentors on refugees and refugee mentors on Ugandans are near zero.

Panel B also estimates the effect of mentee demographics. Male Mentor - Mixed Gender coefficients for male mentees, for instance, estimate the effect of groups with two female instead of two male mentees. This could reflect the peer effects of mentees or the mentor’s response, for instance with increased attention to a mentee of the same gender or nationality. Ugandan male mentees benefit significantly from groups with two refugee mentees and a Ugandan mentor relative to a group with two Ugandan mentees (\$52, $p < 0.05$), while female Ugandan mentees have \$22 lower profits ($p < 0.1$) with groups of two male instead of female mentees.

Panel C of [Table 5](#) estimates heterogeneity by mentor’s characteristics. While mentor characteristics are not randomly assigned, these are plausibly exogenous within strata. Assignment to a mentor with above median baseline profits leads to \$19 higher profits per month for mentees, an effect consistent across demographics. Refugee men also have higher profits (\$30 per month, $p < 0.1$) when their mentors have above median business practices. Female mentees, on the other hand, earn less profit when assigned to a mentor with above median education levels, a relationship that is being further explored. While these characteristics are correlated, these findings are robust to alternative specifications.

7 Results: Social Cohesion

[Table 7](#) displays impacts on social cohesion outcomes using Equation (1) over 12 months. This specification includes the main sample and mentors as pre-specified for social cohesion outcomes. Cash grants—which included an information script about aid-sharing policies between hosts and refugees in Uganda (as explained in [Section 3.2](#))—lead to a 0.15 sd. increase ($p < 0.05$) in our social cohesion index among Ugandans. This measure includes questions on willingness to marry or have as neighbors of the respective out-group—Ugandans or refugees—as well as a donation game, trust game, and a measure of positive sum views presented in the second and fifth columns. Cash grants also increase our policy support index among Ugandans (0.23 sd on a summary index, $p < 0.01$, with components such as freedom of movement and right-to-work), as well as our economic beliefs index capturing Ugandans’ views of the economic effects of refugees (see [Table C21](#)).

For Ugandans, the additional effect of assignment to any mentorship group has insignificant or somewhat negative impacts on these measures. Assignment to mixed nationality groups—groups with two refugee mentees or one refugee mentee and a refugee mentor—has

Table 7: Social Cohesion

	<i>Ugandans</i>			<i>Refugees</i>		
	Social Cohesion Index	When Refs Succeed Ug. Benefit	Political Support Index	Social Cohesion Index	When Ug. Succeed Refs Benefit	Social Proximity Index
Any Cash	0.15** (0.06)	0.04* (0.02)	0.23*** (0.06)	0.08 (0.06)	-0.01 (0.03)	0.04 (0.06)
Basic - Aligned	-0.01 (0.06)	0.01 (0.02)	-0.07 (0.06)	-0.01 (0.07)	-0.03 (0.03)	0.04 (0.06)
Basic - Mixed Gender	-0.03 (0.07)	-0.01 (0.03)	-0.07 (0.06)	-0.02 (0.07)	0.04 (0.03)	-0.02 (0.07)
Basic - Mixed Nat.	-0.03 (0.07)	0.01 (0.03)	-0.12* (0.07)	-0.08 (0.07)	-0.00 (0.04)	0.06 (0.07)
Shared Fate - Aligned	-0.11 (0.07)	-0.01 (0.03)	-0.19** (0.07)	-0.12 (0.09)	-0.06 (0.04)	-0.04 (0.09)
Shared Fate - Mixed Gender	-0.14* (0.08)	-0.04 (0.03)	-0.05 (0.07)	-0.03 (0.09)	0.01 (0.04)	-0.05 (0.08)
Shared Fate - Mixed Nat.	-0.07 (0.07)	0.01 (0.03)	-0.10 (0.07)	0.02 (0.08)	0.02 (0.04)	0.01 (0.08)
Observations	4,678	4,678	4,678	4,365	4,365	4,365
Control Mean: Follow-Ups	0.00	0.79	0.00	0.00	0.50	0.00
Any Cash = Any Mentorship	0.24	0.84	0.03	0.58	0.92	0.91
Any Cash = Aligned	0.06	0.33	0.00	0.28	0.64	0.81
Aligned = Mixed Nat.	0.97	0.62	1.00	0.82	0.15	0.58
Aligned = Mixed Gender	0.57	0.21	0.35	0.65	0.03	0.37
Nat DiD	0.61	0.67	0.24	0.09	0.39	0.74
Gender DiD	0.92	0.75	0.20	0.48	0.91	0.66

An observation is a surveyed respondent, with one per post-baseline survey round. Results estimated through ANCOVA regression with baseline controls selected through double-lasso. Standard errors clustered at the individual level in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

a negative and insignificant effect on our social cohesion index and a significant negative effect on policy support compared to cash (-0.12 sd., $p < 0.1$). This is not an effect specific to intergroup contact, as the negative effect of the Shared Fate-Aligned structure is also negative and significant (-0.19 sd., $p < 0.05$). Overall, we find little evidence that intergroup contact affected views of refugees among Ugandans.

These results are consistent with findings from [Baseler et al. \(2023b\)](#) that information about existing aid-sharing policies changes preferences for accepting and integrating refugees, but contact through a mixed nationality mentorship group does not. Direct experience with and information about aid-sharing—receiving the cash grant accompanied by a short message—changed knowledge of aid-sharing and downstream attitudes.

For refugees, we find no evidence of effects on social cohesion, positive sum views, or a social proximity index that includes feeling isolated in Uganda, eating dinner with Ugandans, and difficulty seeing a doctor. We also find no evidence that contact with Ugandans in the

mixed nationality groups affects intergroup attitudes.

8 Discussion

The results presented here are preliminary, and additional data collection is ongoing. Nevertheless, we have several notable findings. Cash grants bundled with the lottery show strong effects on individual, firm, and household well-being, persisting at least 9 months for all sub-samples. The grants are relatively cost effective, with much of the grant passed through to the capital stock and a corresponding rise in profits. [Cochran-George and Karanja \(2024\)](#) find that IRC’s implementation costs, averaged across all treatment arms, were 29% of the project’s total cost.

Mentorship groups show minimal average effects that mask heterogeneity: men mentored by other men benefited from mentorship, while women mentored by other women realized lower profits compared to cash alone. One of our next steps is to explore heterogeneity by mentor characteristics in significantly more detail.

One important, open question in the literature on refugee integration is how well research findings among non-displaced populations apply in displacement settings. In our context, we find that the cash has similar results for refugees and hosts, but that mentorship has a positive effect for refugee men. Mentorship by a refugee was, on average, not statistically different from mentorship by a Ugandan.

We also measure the program’s impacts on attitudes toward refugees. All treatment arms affected Ugandans’ policy views towards refugees. We believe this operates through the channel identified in [Baseler et al. \(2023b\)](#), informing participants that the program is operating because refugees are present and hosts should benefit too. Intergroup contact, which we tested by varying the composition of the mentorship groups, shows minimal additional effects on attitudes toward refugees.

We plan to pursue a number of next steps. We are currently studying heterogeneity by group members’ baseline attitudes toward refugees (among Ugandans) and toward Ugandans (among refugees), investigating whether a pattern of positive effects coming from “positive matches” discussed by [Loiacono and Silva-Vargas \(2023\)](#) also occurred in our program. We have detailed data on business sectors that could explain some of our findings, for instance if mentorship led to some women to pursue lower-profit sectors. We are also incorporating data on the lottery payouts to assess whether winning the lottery affects group dynamics and social cohesion. Finally, we are incorporating additional social cohesion outcomes, including behavioral outcomes of offering jobs to refugees.

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Appendix for “Cash and Small Business Groups for Ugandans and Refugees”

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A Additional Figures and Tables

A.1 Cash and Any Mentorship

Table A1: Business Outcomes by Baseline Openness

<i>Owns Business, No Baseline Business</i>	All	Ugandan Men	Refugee Men	Ugandan Women	Refugee Women
Any Cash	0.41*** (0.05)	0.56*** (0.08)	0.32*** (0.09)	0.39*** (0.10)	0.35*** (0.09)
Any Mentorship	-0.03 (0.04)	-0.04 (0.06)	-0.03 (0.08)	-0.11* (0.06)	-0.00 (0.08)
Observations	1,949	501	529	437	482
Control Mean	0.31	0.29	0.27	0.45	0.24
<i>Owns Business, Baseline Business Open</i>	All	Ug. Men	Ref. Men	Ug. Wm.	Ref. Wm.
Any Cash	0.04** (0.02)	0.04 (0.04)	0.01 (0.04)	0.05 (0.04)	0.08* (0.04)
Any Mentorship	0.02* (0.01)	0.04 (0.03)	0.06** (0.03)	-0.02 (0.02)	0.04 (0.03)
Observations	4,935	1,244	1,101	1,358	1,232
Control Mean	0.88	0.88	0.89	0.90	0.83
<i>Profits, No Baseline Business</i>	All	Ug. Men	Ref. Men	Ug. Wm.	Ref. Wm.
Any Cash	38.21*** (10.88)	78.47** (36.95)	36.40** (15.66)	10.33 (13.82)	17.96** (8.51)
Any Mentorship	-1.83 (9.77)	9.59 (29.82)	9.77 (20.33)	-12.17 (9.59)	-7.62 (8.27)
Observations	1,949	501	529	437	482
Control Mean	13.58	8.35	9.26	26.90	9.49
<i>Profits, Baseline Business Open</i>	All	Ug. Men	Ref. Men	Ug. Wm.	Ref. Wm.
Any Cash	18.02*** (6.12)	10.56 (12.78)	16.56 (13.94)	18.12 (11.35)	22.55* (11.61)
Any Mentorship	3.29 (5.86)	2.67 (10.26)	29.19* (14.93)	-5.38 (10.02)	-13.93 (11.40)
Observations	4,935	1,244	1,101	1,358	1,232
Control Mean	53.42	63.76	62.99	46.68	41.10

An observation is a surveyed respondent, with one per post-baseline survey round. Results estimated through ANCOVA regression with baseline controls selected through double-lasso. Standard errors clustered at the individual level in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table A2: Business Outcomes by Baseline Networks

<i>Businesss Contacts, Below Median Networks</i>	All	Ugandan Men	Refugee Men	Ugandan Women	Refugee Women
Any Cash	0.09 (0.08)	0.48** (0.21)	0.29** (0.14)	-0.20 (0.18)	0.01 (0.15)
Any Mentorship	-0.11 (0.07)	-0.32** (0.15)	-0.10 (0.13)	-0.12 (0.14)	-0.06 (0.12)
Observations	2,900	460	856	577	1,007
Control Mean	1.48	1.63	1.23	1.97	1.38
<i>Businesss Contacts, Above Median Networks</i>	All	Ug. Men	Ref. Men	Ug. Wm.	Ref. Wm.
Any Cash	0.03 (0.06)	0.08 (0.08)	0.16 (0.19)	0.01 (0.10)	-0.04 (0.13)
Any Mentorship	0.07 (0.05)	-0.00 (0.06)	0.14 (0.11)	0.02 (0.08)	0.22* (0.12)
Observations	3,984	1,285	774	1,218	707
Control Mean	2.12	2.37	1.74	2.30	1.72
<i>Profits, Below Median Networks</i>	All	Ug. Men	Ref. Men	Ug. Wm.	Ref. Wm.
Any Cash	22.86*** (7.57)	66.15*** (18.09)	15.77 (15.13)	-4.79 (17.96)	27.35** (11.99)
Any Mentorship	2.93 (7.56)	2.03 (15.61)	34.35* (17.74)	1.66 (9.81)	-21.12* (11.03)
Observations	2,900	460	856	577	1,007
Control Mean	39.87	25.93	51.15	51.02	31.71
<i>Profits, Above Median Networks</i>	All	Ug. Men	Ref. Men	Ug. Wm.	Ref. Wm.
Any Cash	26.17*** (6.83)	16.87 (14.16)	38.51** (17.33)	34.72*** (11.53)	8.75 (10.13)
Any Mentorship	-0.20 (6.59)	5.58 (12.73)	5.72 (16.96)	-14.69 (10.57)	6.60 (12.08)
Observations	3,984	1,285	774	1,218	707
Control Mean	44.07	57.94	41.15	37.47	35.22

An observation is a surveyed respondent, with one per post-baseline survey round. Results estimated through ANCOVA regression with baseline controls selected through double-lasso. Standard errors clustered at the individual level in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table A3: Business Outcomes by Baseline Practices

<i>Business Practices (Of 11), Below Median Practices</i>	All	Ugandan Men	Refugee Men	Ugandan Women	Refugee Women
Any Cash	0.24 (0.24)	0.30 (0.42)	0.31 (0.63)	0.51 (0.42)	-0.27 (0.43)
Any Mentorship	0.02 (0.17)	-0.17 (0.34)	-0.24 (0.43)	0.10 (0.34)	0.26 (0.35)
Observations	2,120	558	440	634	488
Control Mean	7.51	7.07	7.90	7.47	7.81
<i>Business Practices (Of 11), Above Median Practices</i>	All	Ug. Men	Ref. Men	Ug. Wm.	Ref. Wm.
Any Cash	0.00 (0.15)	-0.17 (0.24)	0.03 (0.37)	0.07 (0.37)	0.23 (0.24)
Any Mentorship	0.09 (0.12)	-0.34 (0.23)	0.23 (0.26)	0.44 (0.28)	-0.05 (0.23)
Observations	2,440	605	580	635	620
Control Mean	9.03	9.34	8.88	8.93	9.03
<i>Profits, Below Median Practices</i>	All	Ug. Men	Ref. Men	Ug. Wm.	Ref. Wm.
Any Cash	13.94* (8.09)	0.40 (17.58)	33.64** (16.07)	10.27 (14.59)	0.23 (10.71)
Any Mentorship	2.45 (6.94)	2.94 (15.95)	-4.18 (14.20)	-6.18 (8.72)	13.77 (10.40)
Observations	2,334	613	483	686	552
Control Mean	51.18	64.32	53.13	48.46	35.66
<i>Profits, Above Median Practices</i>	All	Ug. Men	Ref. Men	Ug. Wm.	Ref. Wm.
Any Cash	20.33** (8.94)	20.19 (22.60)	-5.79 (23.39)	27.48 (18.60)	35.85** (16.80)
Any Mentorship	4.13 (9.01)	6.22 (14.44)	53.17** (24.68)	-5.18 (16.78)	-32.47* (17.48)
Observations	2,601	631	618	672	680
Control Mean	55.40	63.02	68.87	45.07	45.53

An observation is a surveyed respondent, with one per post-baseline survey round. Results estimated through ANCOVA regression with baseline controls selected through double-lasso. Standard errors clustered at the individual level in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

A.2 Mentorship Group Composition

Table A4: Mentorship Group Composition: During Program

<i>A. Business Profits (USD, 30 Days)</i>	All	Ugandan Men	Refugee Men	Ugandan Women	Refugee Women
Basic - Mixed Gender	-18.19** (8.36)	-40.81** (18.36)	-36.26* (21.03)	3.06 (16.33)	-1.68 (11.60)
Basic - Mixed Nat.	-18.45** (8.68)	-27.30 (23.96)	-26.08 (19.63)	-14.63 (12.30)	-6.74 (12.38)
Shared Fate - Aligned	-32.50*** (8.97)	-40.88* (23.60)	-35.39 (25.36)	-9.26 (13.65)	-25.27** (10.32)
Shared Fate - Mixed Gender	-3.64 (10.23)	-2.10 (25.55)	0.43 (23.12)	-16.66 (14.58)	3.06 (15.36)
Shared Fate - Mixed Nat.	0.58 (10.11)	3.59 (23.91)	-16.89 (21.79)	2.99 (16.36)	6.11 (14.25)
Aligned = Mixed Nat.	0.97	0.89	0.39	0.69	0.57
Aligned = Mixed Gender	0.78	0.63	0.46	0.85	0.40
Basic = Shared Fate	0.81	0.65	0.93	0.68	0.83
Nat DiD	0.00	0.05	0.17	0.16	0.03
Gender DiD	0.00	0.01	0.02	0.61	0.11
<i>B. Business Profits (USD, 30 Days)</i>	All	Ug. Men	Ref. Men	Ug. Wm.	Ref. Wm.
Male Mentor - Mixed Gender	-1.96 (7.12)	-10.48 (17.08)	-14.62 (21.42)	7.64 (12.55)	1.69 (9.15)
Female Mentor - Mixed Gender	-1.01 (8.86)	-6.71 (16.17)	-10.02 (17.62)	-22.19 (18.25)	21.20 (17.11)
Ugandan Mentor - Mixed Nat.	-0.35 (7.73)	34.41 (21.62)	-12.05 (16.92)	-14.01 (14.61)	-1.44 (10.90)
Refugee Mentor - Mixed Nat.	1.73 (8.73)	-21.39 (19.74)	-14.20 (18.11)	1.65 (11.62)	22.34 (13.86)
<i>C. Business Profits (USD, 30 Days)</i>	All	Ug. Men	Ref. Men	Ug. Wm.	Ref. Wm.
<u><i>Mentor Baseline Characteristics:</i></u>					
Different Gender	-2.15 (6.55)	-8.93 (16.05)	-8.13 (14.26)	12.76 (11.60)	-8.95 (8.32)
Different Nationality	-1.52 (6.80)	-25.83 (18.65)	-16.06 (14.58)	15.76 (12.26)	-16.90* (10.23)
Above Median Profit	13.58** (5.64)	30.20** (12.95)	-2.19 (12.69)	24.34** (11.34)	9.02 (8.16)
Above Median Experience	-1.10 (5.89)	-2.88 (14.35)	-0.37 (13.11)	6.70 (9.99)	-17.92** (7.87)
Above Median Practices	5.11 (5.72)	-6.94 (12.81)	27.95** (13.56)	11.13 (11.50)	-3.18 (6.70)
Above Median Education	-6.62 (5.76)	4.93 (13.02)	-0.27 (14.85)	-27.53** (12.50)	-0.24 (8.88)
Highest Subjective Assessment	-4.77 (5.43)	-23.64* (12.77)	-10.00 (12.83)	3.19 (8.49)	-9.96 (7.49)
Observations	1,053	259	254	276	264
Sample Mean	59.85	73.51	74.33	46.81	46.16

An observation is a surveyed respondent, with one per post-baseline survey round. Results estimated through ANCOVA regression with baseline controls selected through double-lasso. Standard errors clustered at the individual level in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table A5: Mentorship Group Composition: Openness

<i>A. Owns Business</i>	All	Ugandan Men	Refugee Men	Ugandan Women	Refugee Women
Basic - Mixed Gender	-0.00 (0.02)	-0.02 (0.04)	-0.04 (0.05)	0.10*** (0.04)	-0.04 (0.04)
Basic - Mixed Nat.	0.01 (0.02)	-0.04 (0.03)	0.01 (0.05)	0.05 (0.04)	0.04 (0.04)
Shared Fate - Aligned	0.01 (0.03)	-0.03 (0.04)	-0.00 (0.05)	0.09* (0.05)	0.01 (0.06)
Shared Fate - Mixed Gender	0.00 (0.02)	-0.02 (0.04)	0.02 (0.05)	0.10** (0.05)	-0.07 (0.05)
Shared Fate - Mixed Nat.	-0.02 (0.03)	-0.05 (0.06)	-0.07 (0.05)	0.04 (0.06)	-0.03 (0.05)
Aligned = Mixed Nat.	0.82	0.26	0.56	0.59	0.90
Aligned = Mixed Gender	0.92	0.70	0.73	0.01	0.11
Basic = Shared Fate	0.61	0.53	0.71	0.36	0.44
Nat DiD	0.23	0.78	0.35	0.20	0.35
Gender DiD	1.00	0.63	0.42	0.11	0.62
<i>B. Owns Business</i>	All	Ug. Men	Ref. Men	Ug. Wm.	Ref. Wm.
Male Mentor - Mixed Gender	-0.00 (0.02)	0.02 (0.03)	-0.00 (0.06)	0.10*** (0.03)	-0.09** (0.04)
Female Mentor - Mixed Gender	-0.00 (0.02)	-0.03 (0.03)	-0.02 (0.05)	0.01 (0.04)	0.01 (0.04)
Ugandan Mentor - Mixed Nat.	0.01 (0.02)	0.01 (0.03)	0.02 (0.04)	0.02 (0.06)	-0.02 (0.04)
Refugee Mentor - Mixed Nat.	-0.03 (0.02)	-0.06 (0.04)	-0.11** (0.06)	0.03 (0.04)	0.06 (0.05)
<i>C. Owns Business</i>	All	Ug. Men	Ref. Men	Ug. Wm.	Ref. Wm.
<i>Mentor Baseline Characteristics:</i>					
Different Gender	-0.01 (0.02)	-0.03 (0.03)	-0.01 (0.04)	0.10*** (0.03)	-0.11*** (0.04)
Different Nationality	-0.00 (0.02)	-0.08* (0.04)	0.03 (0.04)	0.00 (0.04)	-0.03 (0.04)
Above Median Profit	-0.02 (0.01)	-0.03 (0.02)	-0.07** (0.03)	-0.05* (0.03)	0.04 (0.03)
Above Median Experience	-0.01 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.03)	0.04 (0.03)	-0.02 (0.03)	-0.05 (0.03)
Above Median Practices	0.00 (0.02)	0.04 (0.03)	0.00 (0.03)	-0.01 (0.03)	-0.03 (0.04)
Above Median Education	0.00 (0.02)	0.02 (0.02)	-0.02 (0.04)	0.06* (0.03)	-0.01 (0.04)
Highest Subjective Assessment	-0.02 (0.01)	-0.03 (0.02)	-0.03 (0.03)	-0.02 (0.03)	-0.04 (0.03)
Observations	4,111	1,040	973	1,082	1,016
Sample Mean	0.88	0.93	0.86	0.89	0.83

An observation is a surveyed respondent, with one per post-baseline survey round. Results estimated through ANCOVA regression with baseline controls selected through double-lasso. Standard errors clustered at the individual level in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table A6: Mentorship Group Composition: Household Well-Being

<i>A. Household Well-Being Index</i>	All	Ugandan Men	Refugee Men	Ugandan Women	Refugee Women
Basic - Mixed Gender	0.05 (0.06)	-0.11 (0.13)	0.08 (0.13)	0.15 (0.13)	0.09 (0.11)
Basic - Mixed Nat.	0.03 (0.07)	0.08 (0.15)	-0.14 (0.13)	0.15 (0.11)	0.13 (0.11)
Shared Fate - Aligned	-0.06 (0.08)	0.12 (0.16)	0.20 (0.16)	-0.00 (0.13)	-0.54*** (0.16)
Shared Fate - Mixed Gender	0.01 (0.08)	-0.16 (0.17)	0.03 (0.17)	0.15 (0.14)	0.11 (0.11)
Shared Fate - Mixed Nat.	0.06 (0.08)	0.26 (0.18)	-0.18 (0.15)	0.03 (0.12)	0.03 (0.13)
Aligned = Mixed Nat.	0.22	0.36	0.04	0.24	0.01
Aligned = Mixed Gender	0.30	0.12	0.99	0.11	0.00
Basic = Shared Fate	0.62	0.38	0.90	0.55	0.02
Nat DiD	0.42	0.82	0.28	0.52	0.04
Gender DiD	0.83	0.44	0.25	0.98	0.01
<i>B. Household Well-Being Index</i>	All	Ug. Men	Ref. Men	Ug. Wm.	Ref. Wm.
Male Mentor - Mixed Gender	0.08 (0.06)	-0.21 (0.14)	0.06 (0.16)	0.19* (0.10)	0.25** (0.11)
Female Mentor - Mixed Gender	0.03 (0.06)	-0.15 (0.12)	-0.03 (0.13)	0.08 (0.16)	0.33*** (0.11)
Ugandan Mentor - Mixed Nat.	0.05 (0.07)	0.22 (0.21)	-0.18 (0.12)	0.06 (0.12)	0.21* (0.12)
Refugee Mentor - Mixed Nat.	0.09 (0.06)	0.06 (0.13)	-0.24* (0.15)	0.13 (0.10)	0.37*** (0.12)
<i>C. Household Well-Being Index</i>	All	Ug. Men	Ref. Men	Ug. Wm.	Ref. Wm.
<i>Mentor Baseline Characteristics:</i>					
Different Gender	0.04 (0.05)	-0.16 (0.12)	-0.07 (0.12)	0.14 (0.10)	0.12 (0.10)
Different Nationality	0.02 (0.06)	0.04 (0.13)	-0.21* (0.12)	0.13 (0.10)	0.06 (0.11)
Above Median Profit	-0.00 (0.04)	-0.01 (0.10)	-0.11 (0.09)	-0.03 (0.08)	0.10 (0.08)
Above Median Experience	0.04 (0.04)	0.14 (0.10)	0.06 (0.09)	0.07 (0.09)	-0.06 (0.08)
Above Median Practices	-0.01 (0.05)	0.10 (0.10)	0.06 (0.10)	-0.15* (0.09)	-0.06 (0.09)
Above Median Education	0.01 (0.05)	0.14 (0.10)	-0.10 (0.09)	-0.00 (0.10)	0.00 (0.09)
Highest Subjective Assessment	-0.05 (0.04)	-0.12 (0.10)	-0.22** (0.09)	-0.02 (0.07)	-0.10 (0.08)
Observations	4,111	1,040	973	1,082	1,016
Sample Mean	0.38	0.57	0.56	0.25	0.15

An observation is a surveyed respondent, with one per post-baseline survey round. Results estimated through ANCOVA regression with baseline controls selected through double-lasso. Standard errors clustered at the individual level in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

A.3 Social Cohesion

Table A7: Mentorship Group Composition: Social Cohesion

<i>A. Social Cohesion Index</i>	All	Ugandan Men	Refugee Men	Ugandan Women	Refugee Women
Basic - Mixed Gender	-0.01 (0.05)	-0.01 (0.09)	-0.05 (0.11)	-0.05 (0.10)	0.03 (0.10)
Basic - Mixed Nat.	-0.04 (0.05)	0.00 (0.10)	0.07 (0.10)	-0.01 (0.10)	-0.18** (0.09)
Shared Fate - Aligned	-0.09 (0.06)	-0.20* (0.10)	-0.22* (0.13)	-0.05 (0.09)	-0.11 (0.12)
Shared Fate - Mixed Gender	-0.06 (0.06)	-0.10 (0.10)	-0.08 (0.13)	-0.13 (0.11)	0.02 (0.11)
Shared Fate - Mixed Nat.	-0.01 (0.06)	-0.03 (0.11)	0.03 (0.12)	-0.11 (0.09)	0.05 (0.10)
Aligned = Mixed Nat.	0.93	0.33	0.16	0.64	0.44
Aligned = Mixed Gender	0.94	0.76	0.96	0.43	0.46
Basic = Shared Fate	0.25	0.11	0.28	0.20	0.53
Nat DiD	0.17	0.31	0.33	0.68	0.04
Gender DiD	0.61	0.49	0.29	0.82	0.56
<i>B. Social Cohesion Index</i>	All	Ug. Men	Ref. Men	Ug. Wm.	Ref. Wm.
Male Mentor - Mixed Gender	0.02 (0.05)	-0.01 (0.09)	0.16 (0.12)	-0.05 (0.09)	0.01 (0.10)
Female Mentor - Mixed Gender	-0.03 (0.05)	0.05 (0.09)	-0.15 (0.11)	-0.08 (0.11)	0.11 (0.10)
Ugandan Mentor - Mixed Nat.	-0.02 (0.05)	0.10 (0.10)	0.06 (0.10)	-0.11 (0.10)	-0.03 (0.10)
Refugee Mentor - Mixed Nat.	0.03 (0.05)	0.04 (0.10)	0.17 (0.11)	0.07 (0.10)	-0.10 (0.09)
<i>C. Social Cohesion Index</i>	All	Ug. Men	Ref. Men	Ug. Wm.	Ref. Wm.
<i>Mentor Baseline Characteristics:</i>					
Different Gender	-0.04 (0.05)	0.02 (0.09)	-0.21* (0.11)	-0.04 (0.10)	0.01 (0.09)
Different Nationality	0.00 (0.05)	0.04 (0.11)	0.00 (0.10)	0.13 (0.10)	-0.05 (0.10)
Above Median Profit	0.07** (0.03)	0.12** (0.06)	0.03 (0.08)	0.15** (0.07)	0.07 (0.07)
Above Median Experience	-0.02 (0.03)	0.07 (0.06)	-0.14* (0.08)	0.01 (0.07)	-0.04 (0.07)
Above Median Practices	-0.07* (0.04)	0.02 (0.07)	0.01 (0.08)	-0.15** (0.07)	-0.11 (0.07)
Above Median Education	0.01 (0.04)	0.00 (0.07)	-0.06 (0.08)	-0.02 (0.08)	-0.02 (0.08)
Highest Subjective Assessment	-0.02 (0.03)	-0.07 (0.06)	0.04 (0.07)	-0.06 (0.07)	-0.03 (0.07)
Observations	5,539	1,418	1,312	1,456	1,353
Sample Mean	0.05	0.15	0.14	0.01	-0.11

An observation is a surveyed respondent, with one per post-baseline survey round. Results estimated through ANCOVA regression with baseline controls selected through double-lasso. Standard errors clustered at the individual level in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

B Additional Details on Research Design

B.1 Balance

Table B1: Randomization Balance

	Control	Cash Only	Basic Aligned	Basic Mixed Gender	Basic Mixed Nat.	SF Aligned	SF Mixed Gender	SF Mixed Nat.	Joint <i>p</i> -value
Age	28.87	28.97	29.13	28.11	28.59	29.53	29.26	28.36	0.50
Years of Education	12.26	12.13	12.23	11.94	12.66	12.19	12.41	12.85	0.27
Years of Experience	3.76	3.72	3.75	3.76	3.79	3.36	3.40	4.20	0.71
Own Business	0.71	0.72	0.69	0.67	0.73	0.69	0.67	0.69	0.69
Profits	29.14	29.15	30.14	22.11	31.69	29.04	25.89	28.68	0.36
Domain 1 Index	-0.00	0.02	-0.01	-0.14	0.06	-0.02	-0.09	-0.03	0.44
Domain 2 Index	0.03	-0.08	-0.02	0.02	-0.06	-0.13	-0.19	0.12	0.05
Domain 3 Index	0.00	0.02	0.11	-0.03	0.08	-0.12	-0.11	0.07	0.10
Domain 4N Index	-0.03	0.05	-0.12	0.04	-0.04	-0.04	-0.14	-0.14	0.17
Domain 5 Index	-0.00	0.02	-0.03	-0.09	-0.01	0.09	-0.04	-0.11	0.60
Domain 6 Index	0.04	0.02	0.03	0.16	-0.02	0.01	0.06	0.03	0.84
Domain 7 Index	0.00	-0.05	-0.04	-0.17	-0.09	-0.04	-0.07	-0.04	0.62
Domain 8 Index	-0.02	0.08	-0.02	0.06	0.19	0.13	-0.01	0.15	0.26
Domain 9 Index	0.03	-0.04	0.09	0.04	0.05	0.11	-0.05	0.11	0.51
Domain 10 Index	0.11	0.10	0.09	0.13	0.05	-0.02	0.04	0.21	0.53

Baseline surveys of main sample. First eight columns show baseline variable means within treatment groups. Column 9 shows *p*-values from joint *F*-tests that means are equal in all treatment groups.

B.2 Attrition

Table B2: Attrition

	3 to 12 Months								
	<i>Ever Surveyed</i>		<i>Pooled Rounds</i>						
	Main Sample	All	Main Sample	All	3-Month	6-Month	9-Month	12-Month	24-Month
Cash Only	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.04** (0.02)	-0.04** (0.02)	-0.05*** (0.02)	-0.05** (0.02)	-0.03 (0.02)	-0.03 (0.02)	-0.05* (0.03)
Basic - Aligned	-0.02 (0.02)	-0.02 (0.01)	-0.04** (0.02)	-0.03** (0.02)	-0.04** (0.02)	-0.04* (0.02)	-0.02 (0.02)	-0.03 (0.02)	-0.00 (0.03)
Basic - Mixed Gender	0.00 (0.01)	0.00 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.02)	-0.00 (0.02)	-0.04* (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)	-0.02 (0.02)	0.03 (0.02)	0.04 (0.03)
Basic - Mixed Nat.	-0.02 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.05** (0.02)	-0.04** (0.02)	-0.06*** (0.02)	-0.04* (0.02)	-0.03 (0.02)	-0.04 (0.03)	-0.02 (0.03)
Shared Fate - Aligned	-0.00 (0.02)	-0.00 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.02)	-0.00 (0.02)	-0.02 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.03)	0.06** (0.03)
Shared Fate - Mixed Gender	-0.01 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.02)	-0.03 (0.02)	-0.02 (0.02)	-0.05** (0.03)	-0.02 (0.03)	-0.00 (0.03)	-0.01 (0.03)	0.04 (0.03)
Shared Fate - Mixed Nat.	0.00 (0.02)	0.01 (0.01)	-0.03 (0.02)	-0.02 (0.02)	-0.02 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.03)	-0.02 (0.03)	-0.05* (0.03)	-0.03 (0.03)
Observations	2,000	2,600	8,000	10,400	2,600	2,600	2,600	2,600	2,600
Control Mean	0.97	0.97	0.88	0.88	0.94	0.89	0.89	0.86	0.81
Joint p -value	0.85	0.72	0.10	0.07	0.03	0.11	0.71	0.11	0.01

An observation is a surveyed respondent, with one per post-baseline survey round. Results estimated through ANCOVA regression with baseline controls selected through double-lasso. Standard errors clustered at the individual level in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

C All Pre-Specified Outcomes

This appendix presents the outcomes specified in our pre-analysis plan.

C.1 Domain 1: Business success

- A binary indicator for whether the respondent operated a business in the past 30 days.
- Self-reported profits from all businesses over the past 30 days. Respondents without operational businesses are coded as 0.

Table C1: Domain 1: Men

	Owns Business	Business Profits	Business Success Index
Any Cash	0.15*** (0.03)	24.62*** (7.90)	0.37*** (0.07)
Basic - Aligned	0.06** (0.03)	15.64 (10.78)	0.16** (0.07)
Basic - Mixed Gender	0.03 (0.03)	14.79 (12.52)	0.08 (0.08)
Basic - Mixed Nat.	0.03 (0.03)	18.51 (12.89)	0.10 (0.07)
Shared Fate - Aligned	0.04 (0.03)	2.29 (13.90)	0.08 (0.08)
Shared Fate - Mixed Gender	0.06* (0.03)	16.01 (15.06)	0.17** (0.09)
Shared Fate - Mixed Nat.	-0.00 (0.04)	19.22 (15.12)	0.03 (0.10)
Baseline	0.22*** (0.02)	0.56*** (0.08)	0.11*** (0.02)
Observations	3,377	3,377	3,377
Control Mean: Baseline	0.70	34.81	0.07
Control Mean: Follow-Ups	0.71	47.23	-0.01
Control SD: Follow-Ups	0.46	86.09	1.02
Any Cash = Any Mentorship	0.09	0.05	0.04
Any Cash = Aligned	0.04	0.39	0.04
Aligned = Mixed Nat.	0.16	0.52	0.34
Aligned = Mixed Gender	0.60	0.72	0.81
Nat DiD	0.85	0.55	0.88
Gender DiD	0.21	0.52	0.14

An observation is a surveyed respondent, with one per post-baseline survey round. Results estimated through ANCOVA regression with baseline controls selected through double-lasso. Standard errors clustered at the individual level in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table C2: Domain 1: Women

	Owns Business	Business Profits	Business Success Index
Any Cash	0.14*** (0.03)	21.90*** (6.27)	0.36*** (0.07)
Basic - Aligned	-0.02 (0.03)	-11.82 (8.30)	-0.07 (0.06)
Basic - Mixed Gender	0.01 (0.03)	-7.20 (8.50)	-0.01 (0.06)
Basic - Mixed Nat.	0.04 (0.03)	-11.83 (7.98)	0.03 (0.06)
Shared Fate - Aligned	0.03 (0.04)	-12.23 (8.00)	0.04 (0.09)
Shared Fate - Mixed Gender	-0.01 (0.03)	-5.02 (9.71)	-0.02 (0.07)
Shared Fate - Mixed Nat.	-0.01 (0.04)	-7.66 (9.00)	-0.06 (0.08)
Baseline	0.40*** (0.10)	0.53*** (0.13)	0.16*** (0.04)
Observations	3,513	3,513	3,513
Control Mean: Baseline	0.73	23.80	-0.05
Control Mean: Follow-Ups	0.73	37.30	0.01
Control SD: Follow-Ups	0.44	70.25	0.97
Any Cash = Any Mentorship	0.84	0.10	0.58
Any Cash = Aligned	0.00	0.00	0.00
Aligned = Mixed Nat.	0.52	0.80	0.61
Aligned = Mixed Gender	0.92	0.46	0.68
Nat DiD	0.09	0.72	0.14
Gender DiD	0.23	0.85	0.29

An observation is a surveyed respondent, with one per post-baseline survey round. Results estimated through ANCOVA regression with baseline controls selected through double-lasso. Standard errors clustered at the individual level in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

C.2 Domain 2: Social cohesion

- Social proximity, computed as an Anderson (2008) index over:
 - “I would only be comfortable marrying a refugee/Ugandan, not someone of another nationality.”
 - “I would only be comfortable having a refugee/Ugandan marry a member of my family, not someone of another nationality”
 - “I would only be comfortable having a refugee/Ugandan as a close, personal friend, not someone of another nationality”
 - “I would only be comfortable having a refugee/Ugandan as a neighbor, not someone of another nationality”
- “When [refugees’/Ugandans’] businesses are successful, [Ugandans/refugees] benefit”
- Inter-group altruism, measured by the amount donated to an anonymous receiver of a different identity in a dictator game.
- Inter-group trust, measured by the amount of money sent to an anonymous partner of a different identity in an incentivized trust game.
- Inter-group trust, measured by willingness to make a job referral to a confederate staff member of another nationality.
- “Would you be open to collaborating with business owners from a country other than [origin country]?”

Table C3: Domain 2: Ugandans

C-4

	Comfort w/ OG Spouse	Comfort w/ OG Marriage	Comfort w/ OG Friend	Comfort w/ OG Neighbor	Ref Benefit Ug Bus. Succeed	Ug Benefit Ref Bus. Succeed	Altruism Toward OG	Trust in OG	Open to Collab, Other Nat	Social Cohesion Index
Any Cash	0.06** (0.03)	0.08*** (0.03)	0.05** (0.02)	0.05** (0.02)	0.04 (0.03)	0.04* (0.02)	30.38 (35.78)	-3.55 (30.49)	0.00 (0.02)	0.15** (0.06)
Basic - Aligned	0.03 (0.03)	-0.01 (0.03)	0.01 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)	0.01 (0.03)	0.01 (0.02)	-57.71 (37.08)	-3.37 (31.00)	0.02 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.06)
Basic - Mixed Gender	-0.02 (0.03)	-0.03 (0.03)	-0.02 (0.02)	-0.03 (0.02)	0.01 (0.03)	-0.01 (0.03)	-27.10 (38.94)	16.87 (35.93)	0.00 (0.02)	-0.03 (0.07)
Basic - Mixed Nat.	-0.01 (0.03)	-0.06* (0.03)	-0.04* (0.03)	-0.04* (0.02)	0.02 (0.03)	0.01 (0.03)	-14.85 (42.92)	30.96 (34.98)	0.01 (0.01)	-0.03 (0.07)
Shared Fate - Aligned	-0.06* (0.03)	-0.06** (0.03)	-0.06** (0.03)	-0.05* (0.03)	-0.02 (0.03)	-0.01 (0.03)	-44.72 (41.03)	26.75 (37.48)	-0.05* (0.03)	-0.11 (0.07)
Shared Fate - Mixed Gender	-0.03	-0.05	-0.03	-0.04	0.00	-0.04	- 89.90**	-6.04	-0.00	-0.14*
Shared Fate - Mixed Nat.	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(42.27)	(38.93)	(0.02)	(0.08)
	-0.05 (0.04)	-0.06* (0.03)	-0.04 (0.03)	-0.04 (0.03)	-0.01 (0.03)	0.01 (0.03)	-16.79 (47.95)	20.98 (41.32)	0.02 (0.02)	-0.07 (0.07)
Baseline	0.21*** (0.03)	0.14*** (0.03)	0.05 (0.03)	0.06* (0.03)	0.00 (.)	0.00 (.)	0.17*** (0.02)	0.22*** (0.03)	-0.02 (0.03)	0.18*** (0.02)
Observations	4,678	4,678	4,678	4,678	4,678	4,678	4,678	2,351	2,165	4,678
Control Mean: Baseline	0.81	0.84	0.93	0.94	-99.00	-99.00	1,009.82	1,115.00	0.99	0.01
Control Mean: Follow-Ups	0.69	0.72	0.81	0.81	0.72	0.79	851.51	1,046.07	0.96	0.00
Control SD: Follow-Ups	0.46	0.45	0.39	0.39	0.45	0.41	556.09	374.41	0.19	1.00
Any Cash = Any Mentorship	0.43	0.03	0.13	0.09	0.78	0.84	0.16	0.61	0.81	0.24
Any Cash = Aligned	0.18	0.01	0.08	0.06	0.44	0.33	0.18	0.84	0.78	0.06
Aligned = Mixed Nat.	0.31	0.21	0.17	0.13	0.77	0.62	0.24	0.47	0.10	0.97
Aligned = Mixed Gender	0.38	0.65	0.64	0.24	0.77	0.21	0.98	0.99	0.65	0.57
Nat DiD	0.35	0.40	0.10	0.15	0.83	0.67	0.82	0.47	0.02	0.61
Gender DiD	0.12	0.56	0.16	0.24	0.67	0.75	0.20	0.33	0.07	0.92

An observation is a surveyed respondent, with one per post-baseline survey round. Results estimated through ANCOVA regression with baseline controls selected through double-lasso. Standard errors clustered at the individual level in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table C4: Domain 2: Refugees

	Comfort w/ OG Spouse	Comfort w/ OG Marriage	Comfort w/ OG Friend	Comfort w/ OG Neighbor	Ref Benefit Ug Bus. Succeed	Ug Benefit Ref Bus. Succeed	Altruism Toward OG	Trust in OG	Open to Collab, Other Nat	Social Cohesion Index
Any Cash	0.11*** (0.03)	0.09*** (0.03)	0.07** (0.03)	0.06** (0.03)	-0.01 (0.03)	-0.02 (0.03)	19.27 (29.41)	-21.79 (31.06)	-0.09** (0.04)	0.08 (0.06)
Basic - Aligned	-0.06* (0.03)	-0.07** (0.03)	-0.02 (0.03)	-0.05* (0.03)	-0.03 (0.03)	0.04 (0.03)	25.95 (32.27)	33.84 (33.09)	0.08* (0.04)	-0.01 (0.07)
Basic - Mixed Gender	-0.07* (0.04)	-0.06* (0.03)	-0.06* (0.03)	-0.07** (0.03)	0.04 (0.03)	0.03 (0.03)	-21.16 (35.46)	47.77 (37.28)	0.15*** (0.04)	-0.02 (0.07)
Basic - Mixed Nat.	-0.09** (0.04)	-0.07* (0.04)	0.00 (0.03)	-0.03 (0.03)	-0.00 (0.04)	0.01 (0.03)	-38.77 (33.16)	9.58 (37.74)	0.10** (0.04)	-0.08 (0.07)
Shared Fate - Aligned	-0.09** (0.04)	-0.07* (0.04)	-0.04 (0.04)	-0.06* (0.03)	-0.06 (0.04)	-0.03 (0.04)	8.43 (36.71)	32.86 (40.72)	0.09** (0.04)	-0.12 (0.09)
Shared Fate - Mixed Gender	-0.10** (0.04)	- (0.04)	-0.06 (0.04)	-0.07** (0.03)	0.01 (0.04)	0.03 (0.03)	-24.97 (45.25)	82.70* (42.58)	0.01 (0.05)	-0.03 (0.09)
Shared Fate - Mixed Nat.	-0.04 (0.04)	-0.04 (0.04)	-0.04 (0.04)	-0.03 (0.03)	0.02 (0.04)	0.06* (0.03)	-15.95 (38.57)	59.34 (40.45)	0.02 (0.05)	0.02 (0.08)
Baseline	0.17*** (0.02)	0.09*** (0.03)	0.08*** (0.03)	0.09*** (0.03)	0.00 (.)	0.00 (.)	0.10*** (0.02)	0.22*** (0.03)	0.23** (0.10)	0.18*** (0.02)
Observations	4,365	4,365	4,365	4,365	4,365	4,365	4,365	2,244	1,090	4,365
Control Mean: Baseline	0.60	0.68	0.91	0.90	-99.00	-99.00	870.83	1,043.44	0.98	0.02
Control Mean: Follow-Ups	0.52	0.53	0.67	0.70	0.50	0.74	656.82	901.23	0.90	0.00
Control SD: Follow-Ups	0.50	0.50	0.47	0.46	0.50	0.44	464.91	409.32	0.30	1.00
Any Cash = Any Mentorship	0.01	0.01	0.20	0.03	0.92	0.25	0.75	0.11	0.01	0.58
Any Cash = Aligned	0.00	0.00	0.06	0.01	0.64	0.49	0.99	0.30	0.01	0.28
Aligned = Mixed Nat.	0.92	0.73	0.59	0.49	0.15	0.47	0.06	0.87	0.78	0.89
Aligned = Mixed Gender	0.87	0.63	0.36	0.58	0.03	0.42	0.13	0.35	0.49	0.65
Nat DiD	0.13	0.67	0.59	0.81	0.39	0.01	0.46	0.41	0.13	0.09
Gender DiD	0.97	0.31	0.75	0.91	0.91	0.13	0.82	0.56	0.02	0.48

An observation is a surveyed respondent, with one per post-baseline survey round. Results estimated through ANCOVA regression with baseline controls selected through double-lasso. Standard errors clustered at the individual level in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

C.3 Domain 3: Business practices

- A binary variable indicating whether the business is officially registered.
- Business capital. We sum two variables.⁸
 - “If you were to sell all the [business equipment] you own right now, how much do you think you could make?” This is asked item-by-item and summed.
 - “If you were to sell all the inventory you own right now, how much do you think you could make?”
- Number of hours worked at all businesses over the past 7 days.
- “How much total business-related debt do you currently have?”
- Number of contacts listed in a business networks module.
- The number of “Yes” responses to the following questions about whether they did the following in the past 30 days:
 - Visited at least one of your competitor’s businesses to see what prices your competitors are charging.
 - Visited at least one of your competitor’s businesses to see what products your competitors have available for sale.
 - Asked existing customers whether there are any other products the customers would like the business to sell or produce.
 - Talked with at least one former customer to find out why former customers have stopped buying from your business.
 - Asked a supplier about which products are selling well in your business’ industry.
 - Attracted customers with a special offer on price.
 - Attempted to negotiate with a supplier for a lower price on supplies.

⁸We analyze the inverse hyperbolic sine transformation of the total.

- Compared the prices or quality offered by alternate suppliers or sources of raw materials to your business' current suppliers or sources of raw material.
 - Ran out of stock or raw materials once per month or more. (“No” is counted as 1.)
 - Record every purchase and sale made by your business.
 - Kept a complete written budget, which states how much is owed each month for rent, electricity, supplies, and all other costs to business.
- “Over the last 30 days, how often did you spend money advertising your business? Every day, every week, every month, a couple times, or never?”
 - “How often did you keep written books/accounting records? Always, frequently, sometimes, occasionally, or never?”
 - “How often did you sell goods or provide services to customers on credit? For all sales, most sales, some sales, a few sales, or never?” (will be excluded from domain index)
 - “How often did you buy materials, tools, or machines for your business on credit? For all sales, most sales, some sales, a few sales, or never?” (will be excluded from domain index)
 - “In the last 3 months, have you offered a new product or service at your business that you did not offer previously?”
 - “In the past 30 days, have you thought carefully about what your specific goals for your business are in the next 6 months or so?”
 - Do you keep your business and personal finances separate?
 - Do you feel like an outsider in the small business community?
 - Do you feel like you have the basic skills and abilities to be successful in business?
 - Do you feel like you will be able to overcome the difficulties you experience in business?

- How confident do you feel about successfully identifying new business opportunities?

Table C5: Domain 3a: Men

	Business Registered	Business Capital	Hours Worked, All Bus.	Total Bus. Debt	N Contacts in Network	Bus. Practice Score	Advertising Spending	Keeps Bus. Records	Sales Made on Credit
Any Cash	0.03 (0.04)	457.99*** (85.34)	1.00 (2.17)	-12.50 (18.11)	0.17** (0.07)	0.09 (0.20)	0.02 (0.04)	0.07* (0.04)	-0.03 (0.03)
Basic - Aligned	0.03 (0.04)	22.67 (93.27)	2.10 (2.22)	24.01 (21.57)	0.05 (0.08)	0.02 (0.20)	0.03 (0.04)	0.05 (0.04)	0.04 (0.03)
Basic - Mixed Gender	0.00 (0.04)	-75.74 (120.06)	-2.13 (2.37)	-4.56 (19.02)	-0.07 (0.08)	0.12 (0.22)	0.01 (0.04)	0.04 (0.04)	0.06 (0.04)
Basic - Mixed Nat.	0.02 (0.05)	-39.16 (126.42)	0.81 (2.70)	38.85 (24.71)	0.06 (0.09)	0.26 (0.21)	-0.01 (0.04)	0.06 (0.04)	0.05 (0.04)
Shared Fate - Aligned	-0.05 (0.04)	-69.14 (115.99)	-2.09 (2.95)	60.79* (33.33)	0.02 (0.09)	-0.28 (0.27)	0.01 (0.05)	-0.02 (0.05)	-0.01 (0.05)
Shared Fate - Mixed Gender	0.03 (0.05)	44.64 (132.50)	5.84** (2.92)	-8.87 (22.16)	-0.17* (0.10)	-0.18 (0.23)	0.01 (0.04)	0.04 (0.04)	-0.00 (0.04)
Shared Fate - Mixed Nat.	0.01 (0.04)	88.27 (161.61)	2.90 (3.03)	7.83 (21.26)	-0.21** (0.10)	0.04 (0.25)	0.06 (0.05)	0.04 (0.05)	0.03 (0.04)
Baseline	0.47*** (0.04)	0.62*** (0.07)	0.29*** (0.03)	0.34*** (0.06)	0.22*** (0.02)	0.38*** (0.03)	0.19*** (0.03)	0.22*** (0.03)	0.16*** (0.03)
Observations	2,877	3,377	2,877	2,873	3,377	2,877	3,011	3,011	3,011
Control Mean: Baseline	0.23	515.48	54.33	76.32	1.63	8.18	0.33	0.49	0.37
Control Mean: Follow-Ups	0.29	459.56	52.49	81.59	1.81	8.24	0.42	0.57	0.39
Control SD: Follow-Ups	0.45	762.81	28.83	194.48	1.15	2.49	0.49	0.50	0.49
Any Cash = Any Mentorship	0.70	0.96	0.48	0.23	0.51	0.80	0.53	0.14	0.21
Any Cash = Aligned	0.75	0.00	0.96	0.16	0.24	0.63	0.88	0.51	0.33
Aligned = Mixed Nat.	0.77	0.84	0.70	0.70	0.24	0.18	0.83	0.52	0.52
Aligned = Mixed Gender	0.83	0.81	0.84	0.02	0.04	0.69	0.66	0.66	0.62
Nat DiD	0.28	0.27	0.19	0.13	0.10	0.87	0.28	0.52	0.64
Gender DiD	0.11	0.24	0.01	0.33	0.62	0.99	0.73	0.35	0.87

An observation is a surveyed respondent, with one per post-baseline survey round. Results estimated through ANCOVA regression with baseline controls selected through double-lasso. Standard errors clustered at the individual level in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table C6: Domain 3a: Women

	Business Registered	Business Capital	Hours Worked, All Bus.	Total Bus. Debt	N Contacts in Network	Bus. Practice Score	Advertising Spending	Keeps Bus. Records	Sales Made on Credit
Any Cash	0.05* (0.03)	296.42*** (54.47)	2.98 (2.27)	-23.98** (10.12)	-0.03 (0.07)	0.06 (0.18)	-0.02 (0.03)	0.09** (0.04)	-0.02 (0.03)
Basic - Aligned	-0.03 (0.03)	-85.63 (67.77)	1.98 (2.43)	4.32 (9.90)	0.01 (0.08)	-0.08 (0.19)	0.07** (0.03)	0.01 (0.03)	-0.02 (0.03)
Basic - Mixed Gender	-0.00 (0.04)	-56.55 (64.01)	-0.41 (2.51)	9.87 (13.07)	-0.00 (0.08)	0.19 (0.19)	0.08** (0.04)	0.04 (0.04)	0.01 (0.04)
Basic - Mixed Nat.	-0.03 (0.03)	-96.21 (67.67)	-0.00 (2.61)	13.12 (10.42)	0.02 (0.09)	0.04 (0.20)	0.10*** (0.04)	0.01 (0.04)	0.03 (0.04)
Shared Fate - Aligned	-0.04 (0.04)	-88.16 (78.14)	-0.29 (3.41)	25.84* (14.70)	0.08 (0.10)	0.42* (0.25)	0.07 (0.05)	0.01 (0.05)	0.14*** (0.04)
Shared Fate - Mixed Gender	-0.06 (0.04)	-84.84 (68.41)	2.07 (3.21)	-2.39 (11.32)	-0.12 (0.10)	0.36 (0.23)	0.07 (0.04)	0.02 (0.04)	0.02 (0.04)
Shared Fate - Mixed Nat.	-0.06 (0.04)	-126.88* (68.92)	-5.22** (2.62)	-11.62 (9.10)	0.13 (0.10)	0.16 (0.24)	0.08* (0.04)	0.10** (0.04)	0.01 (0.04)
Baseline	0.54*** (0.04)	0.39*** (0.06)	0.24*** (0.03)	0.37*** (0.07)	0.20*** (0.02)	0.32*** (0.03)	0.25*** (0.03)	0.21*** (0.02)	0.17*** (0.02)
Observations	2,956	3,513	2,956	2,956	3,513	2,956	3,119	3,119	3,119
Control Mean: Baseline	0.16	300.66	47.69	59.21	1.57	8.19	0.25	0.44	0.28
Control Mean: Follow-Ups	0.17	266.77	49.50	70.76	1.88	8.33	0.35	0.53	0.38
Control SD: Follow-Ups	0.38	497.07	29.22	170.31	1.11	2.26	0.48	0.50	0.49
Any Cash = Any Mentorship	0.27	0.09	0.85	0.30	0.77	0.29	0.00	0.24	0.48
Any Cash = Aligned	0.14	0.00	0.62	0.02	0.62	0.89	0.10	0.17	0.53
Aligned = Mixed Nat.	0.74	0.66	0.11	0.32	0.68	0.93	0.48	0.29	0.82
Aligned = Mixed Gender	0.82	0.71	0.77	0.58	0.23	0.33	0.79	0.50	0.75
Nat DiD	0.79	0.79	0.53	0.02	0.76	0.32	0.70	0.17	0.01
Gender DiD	0.40	0.80	0.32	0.13	0.20	0.36	0.82	0.83	0.03

An observation is a surveyed respondent, with one per post-baseline survey round. Results estimated through ANCOVA regression with baseline controls selected through double-lasso. Standard errors clustered at the individual level in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table C7: Domain 3b: Men

C-10

	Business Purchases on Credit	Offered New Product	Thought About Goals	Personal Finances Separate	Outsider in Bus. Community	Has Bus. Skills For Success	Overcome Business Difficulty	Can Identify New Opp.	Business Practices Index
Any Cash	-0.09*** (0.03)	0.02 (0.03)	0.01 (0.03)	0.03 (0.03)	-0.02 (0.03)	-0.02 (0.02)	0.00 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.02)	0.22*** (0.06)
Basic - Aligned	0.01 (0.03)	0.03 (0.04)	0.02 (0.03)	0.07** (0.03)	-0.03 (0.04)	0.03* (0.02)	0.00 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)	0.09 (0.06)
Basic - Mixed Gender	0.05 (0.04)	-0.00 (0.04)	-0.04 (0.04)	0.08** (0.04)	0.03 (0.04)	0.03 (0.02)	0.02 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.02)	-0.04 (0.08)
Basic - Mixed Nat.	0.02 (0.03)	0.08* (0.04)	0.03 (0.03)	0.10*** (0.03)	0.00 (0.04)	0.02 (0.02)	0.04* (0.02)	0.02 (0.02)	0.00 (0.08)
Shared Fate - Aligned	-0.04 (0.04)	-0.02 (0.04)	0.03 (0.03)	0.07* (0.04)	-0.03 (0.04)	0.02 (0.02)	0.04* (0.02)	-0.01 (0.02)	-0.03 (0.07)
Shared Fate - Mixed Gender	0.03 (0.04)	-0.08* (0.04)	-0.06 (0.04)	0.06 (0.04)	0.01 (0.05)	0.02 (0.02)	0.02 (0.03)	0.02 (0.02)	0.01 (0.07)
Shared Fate - Mixed Nat.	0.03 (0.04)	0.09** (0.05)	-0.05 (0.05)	0.07* (0.04)	-0.05 (0.04)	0.01 (0.03)	0.00 (0.03)	-0.03 (0.02)	0.02 (0.09)
Baseline	0.15*** (0.03)	0.10*** (0.03)	0.03 (0.06)	0.16*** (0.03)	0.00 (.)	0.00 (.)	0.00 (.)	0.00 (.)	0.17*** (0.03)
Observations	3,011	3,011	765	3,011	2,507	2,507	2,507	2,507	3,377
Control Mean: Baseline	0.26	0.38	0.94	0.62	-99.00	-99.00	-99.00	-99.00	0.06
Control Mean: Follow-Ups	0.29	0.32	0.93	0.67	0.39	0.94	0.90	0.94	0.01
Control SD: Follow-Ups	0.45	0.47	0.26	0.47	0.49	0.24	0.30	0.24	1.01
Any Cash = Any Mentorship	0.37	0.35	0.78	0.00	0.75	0.10	0.23	0.92	0.74
Any Cash = Aligned	0.10	0.97	0.74	0.51	0.87	0.07	0.71	0.75	0.11
Aligned = Mixed Nat.	0.27	0.05	0.26	0.48	0.70	0.33	0.52	1.00	0.52
Aligned = Mixed Gender	0.08	0.13	0.01	0.92	0.10	0.85	0.76	0.90	0.26
Nat DiD	0.35	0.39	0.10	0.60	0.54	0.99	0.06	0.21	0.26
Gender DiD	0.58	0.61	0.53	0.85	0.80	0.81	0.25	0.13	0.12

An observation is a surveyed respondent, with one per post-baseline survey round. Results estimated through ANCOVA regression with baseline controls selected through double-lasso. Standard errors clustered at the individual level in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table C8: Domain 3b: Women

	Business Purchases on Credit	Offered New Product	Thought About Goals	Personal Finances Separate	Outsider in Bus. Community	Has Bus. Skills For Success	Overcome Business Difficulty	Can Identify New Opp.	Business Practices Index
Any Cash	-0.04 (0.03)	0.06* (0.03)	0.04 (0.03)	0.07** (0.03)	-0.04 (0.03)	0.01 (0.02)	-0.00 (0.02)	-0.04** (0.02)	0.20*** (0.06)
Basic - Aligned	-0.01 (0.03)	-0.00 (0.03)	0.01 (0.03)	-0.03 (0.03)	0.03 (0.04)	-0.04** (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)	0.02 (0.02)	0.02 (0.06)
Basic - Mixed Gender	-0.00 (0.03)	0.05 (0.04)	0.00 (0.03)	0.01 (0.03)	-0.01 (0.04)	-0.00 (0.02)	0.03 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)	0.05 (0.07)
Basic - Mixed Nat.	0.01 (0.03)	0.04 (0.04)	-0.02 (0.03)	-0.03 (0.04)	-0.01 (0.04)	0.00 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)	0.04* (0.02)	0.08 (0.06)
Shared Fate - Aligned	0.04 (0.04)	0.02 (0.04)	-0.05 (0.04)	-0.02 (0.04)	0.04 (0.04)	0.02 (0.02)	0.05** (0.02)	0.02 (0.03)	0.04 (0.09)
Shared Fate - Mixed Gender	-0.03 (0.04)	-0.08** (0.04)	-0.02 (0.04)	0.03 (0.04)	-0.00 (0.04)	-0.01 (0.02)	0.05** (0.02)	0.03 (0.02)	0.07 (0.08)
Shared Fate - Mixed Nat.	-0.03 (0.03)	0.03 (0.04)	0.03 (0.03)	0.03 (0.03)	-0.02 (0.04)	0.02 (0.02)	0.04** (0.02)	0.05** (0.02)	0.08 (0.08)
Baseline	0.14*** (0.03)	0.10*** (0.02)	-0.00 (0.04)	0.14*** (0.03)	0.00 (.)	0.00 (.)	0.00 (.)	0.00 (.)	0.19*** (0.03)
Observations	3,119	3,119	789	3,119	2,612	2,612	2,612	2,612	3,513
Control Mean: Baseline	0.15	0.35	1.00	0.68	-99.00	-99.00	-99.00	-99.00	0.01
Control Mean: Follow-Ups	0.23	0.32	0.87	0.71	0.40	0.94	0.91	0.94	-0.01
Control SD: Follow-Ups	0.42	0.47	0.34	0.45	0.49	0.24	0.29	0.23	0.99
Any Cash = Any Mentorship	0.74	0.56	0.94	0.93	0.99	0.39	0.07	0.15	0.24
Any Cash = Aligned	0.49	0.28	0.37	0.08	0.23	0.18	0.39	0.07	0.08
Aligned = Mixed Nat.	0.56	0.26	0.78	0.57	0.12	0.03	0.81	0.16	0.34
Aligned = Mixed Gender	0.46	0.97	0.98	0.19	0.20	0.33	0.53	0.97	0.60
Nat DiD	0.15	0.65	0.11	0.34	0.70	0.09	0.83	0.86	0.87
Gender DiD	0.18	0.01	0.65	0.85	1.00	0.02	0.65	0.81	0.94

An observation is a surveyed respondent, with one per post-baseline survey round. Results estimated through ANCOVA regression with baseline controls selected through double-lasso. Standard errors clustered at the individual level in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

C.4 Domain 4: Inter-Nationality Contact and Inter-Gender Contact

Domain 4N: Inter-Nationality Contact

- “Think about all of your business’ customers. How many of your customers are from a different country than you? All, most, some, few, or none?”
- “How many of your business collaborators are from a country other than [origin country]?”
- “How many of your suppliers are from a country other than [origin country]”
- “Are any of your employees from a different country than you?”
- “In the past 30 days, how many [refugees/Ugandans] have you contacted for any social reason, such as having a long conversation?”
- Number of people from another country listed in the networks module.
- “How often do you have any contact with [other nationality] when you are out? This could be on public transport, in the street, in shops or in the neighbourhood.”
- Indicator for whether they participate in any social activities with members of the other nationality.
- “Please think about the businesses you have sold goods or services to within the past 3 months. Do not count consumers, just other businesses. How many of those businesses are managed by people from [other nationality]”

Domain 4G: Inter-Gender Contact

- Number of people from another gender listed in the networks module.

Table C9: Domain 4: Ugandans

	Customers From Oth. Countries	Collaborators From Oth. Countries	Suppliers From Oth. Countries	Employees From Oth. Countries	Social Interaction w/ OG	N Network Outside Own Nat	Contact in Community w/ OG	Social Activities w/ OG	Client Bus. Managed by Oth. Nat	N Network Outside Gender	Contact, Nationality Index	Contact, Gender Index
Any Cash	0.01 (0.01)	-0.02 (0.04)	0.02 (0.04)	0.10*** (0.03)	0.02 (0.03)	0.02 (0.04)	0.05* (0.03)	0.02 (0.03)	-0.00 (0.03)	0.04 (0.05)	0.06 (0.06)	0.06 (0.07)
Basic - Aligned	-0.01 (0.01)	0.07* (0.04)	0.03 (0.04)	0.00 (0.04)	0.01 (0.03)	-0.02 (0.04)	-0.04 (0.03)	0.00 (0.03)	0.06 (0.04)	0.00 (0.06)	0.02 (0.06)	0.00 (0.08)
Basic - Mixed Gender	-0.03 (0.02)	0.03 (0.04)	0.00 (0.04)	0.00 (0.04)	-0.01 (0.03)	0.00 (0.05)	-0.04 (0.03)	-0.01 (0.03)	0.01 (0.04)	-0.03 (0.06)	-0.05 (0.08)	-0.03 (0.08)
Basic - Mixed Nat.	-0.00 (0.01)	0.08* (0.04)	-0.02 (0.04)	-0.02 (0.04)	0.04 (0.03)	0.01 (0.04)	-0.04 (0.03)	0.00 (0.03)	0.04 (0.04)	0.00 (0.06)	0.04 (0.07)	0.00 (0.09)
Shared Fate - Aligned	-0.02 (0.02)	0.09** (0.04)	0.01 (0.05)	-0.02 (0.04)	-0.01 (0.03)	-0.09** (0.04)	-0.03 (0.04)	0.02 (0.03)	0.08* (0.04)	-0.09 (0.07)	0.01 (0.08)	-0.12 (0.10)
Shared Fate - Mixed Gender	-0.01 (0.02)	0.02 (0.04)	-0.05 (0.04)	-0.06 (0.05)	0.03 (0.03)	0.02 (0.05)	-0.07* (0.04)	-0.01 (0.03)	0.03 (0.04)	0.03 (0.07)	-0.02 (0.08)	0.06 (0.09)
Shared Fate - Mixed Nat.	-0.02 (0.02)	0.05 (0.04)	-0.04 (0.05)	-0.02 (0.05)	0.01 (0.03)	-0.03 (0.05)	-0.02 (0.04)	0.00 (0.03)	0.07 (0.05)	-0.01 (0.07)	0.01 (0.08)	-0.01 (0.10)
Baseline	0.12*** (0.03)	0.18*** (0.03)	0.16*** (0.03)	0.32*** (0.07)	0.19*** (0.03)	0.30*** (0.05)	0.06*** (0.02)	0.08** (0.03)	0.24*** (0.05)	0.36*** (0.03)	0.24*** (0.02)	0.35*** (0.03)
Observations	4,280	3,876	4,319	1,824	4,678	4,220	3,680	4,678	2,859	4,220	4,678	4,220
Control Mean: Baseline	0.94	0.45	0.45	0.11	0.82	0.20	0.71	0.78	0.63	0.45	0.01	0.09
Control Mean: Follow-Ups	0.96	0.53	0.48	0.05	0.79	0.26	0.67	0.79	0.29	0.52	0.00	0.09
Control SD: Follow-Ups	0.19	0.50	0.50	0.23	0.41	0.56	0.47	0.41	0.46	0.77	1.00	1.04
Any Cash = Any Mentorship	0.18	0.05	0.86	0.58	0.64	0.63	0.08	0.97	0.12	0.78	1.00	0.81
Any Cash = Aligned	0.34	0.13	0.97	0.07	0.66	0.30	0.09	0.73	0.24	0.46	0.62	0.47
Aligned = Mixed Nat.	0.67	0.75	0.14	0.60	0.24	0.24	0.81	0.78	0.63	0.58	0.76	0.57
Aligned = Mixed Gender	0.69	0.11	0.23	0.64	0.82	0.17	0.53	0.31	0.09	0.56	0.37	0.49
Nat DiD	0.78	0.43	0.99	0.77	0.84	0.67	0.83	0.82	0.91	0.43	0.85	0.40
Gender DiD	0.42	0.69	0.72	0.60	0.21	0.23	0.54	0.84	1.00	0.13	0.73	0.12

An observation is a surveyed respondent, with one per post-baseline survey round. Results estimated through ANCOVA regression with baseline controls selected through double-lasso. Standard errors clustered at the individual level in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table C10: Domain 4: Refugees

	Customers From Oth. Countries	Collaborators From Oth. Countries	Suppliers From Oth. Countries	Employees From Oth. Countries	Social Interaction w/ OG	N Network Outside Own Nat	Contact in Community w/ OG	Social Activities w/ OG	Client Bus. Managed by Oth. Nat	N Network Outside Gender	Contact, Nationality Index	Contact, Gender Index
Any Cash	0.01 (0.01)	0.06*** (0.02)	0.00 (0.02)	0.10** (0.04)	-0.01 (0.02)	0.06 (0.06)	0.03 (0.03)	0.01 (0.02)	0.12*** (0.04)	0.07 (0.05)	0.11* (0.06)	0.10 (0.07)
Basic - Aligned	0.01 (0.01)	-0.04* (0.02)	-0.01 (0.02)	0.02 (0.05)	0.01 (0.02)	-0.02 (0.07)	0.02 (0.03)	0.00 (0.02)	-0.05 (0.04)	-0.00 (0.05)	-0.02 (0.06)	-0.00 (0.07)
Basic - Mixed Gender	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.06** (0.03)	0.01 (0.02)	0.02 (0.05)	0.00 (0.02)	-0.06 (0.07)	-0.03 (0.03)	-0.02 (0.02)	-0.08** (0.04)	0.03 (0.06)	-0.09 (0.07)	0.04 (0.08)
Basic - Mixed Nat.	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.05** (0.02)	-0.02 (0.03)	-0.07 (0.06)	0.03 (0.02)	0.01 (0.07)	-0.00 (0.03)	0.01 (0.02)	-0.08* (0.04)	-0.06 (0.06)	-0.04 (0.07)	-0.08 (0.08)
Shared Fate - Aligned	-0.03 (0.02)	-0.07** (0.03)	-0.04 (0.04)	0.01 (0.07)	0.02 (0.02)	-0.02 (0.07)	-0.03 (0.03)	-0.01 (0.02)	-0.08* (0.05)	-0.02 (0.06)	-0.09 (0.08)	-0.02 (0.08)
Shared Fate - Mixed Gender	-0.02 (0.02)	-0.04 (0.03)	0.04 (0.02)	-0.02 (0.06)	-0.05* (0.03)	0.03 (0.08)	-0.02 (0.03)	-0.08** (0.03)	-0.04 (0.05)	-0.09 (0.06)	-0.20** (0.09)	-0.12 (0.08)
Shared Fate - Mixed Nat.	-0.03 (0.02)	-0.04 (0.03)	-0.01 (0.03)	-0.02 (0.05)	0.05** (0.02)	0.08 (0.08)	0.02 (0.03)	0.03 (0.02)	-0.05 (0.05)	-0.03 (0.06)	0.05 (0.07)	-0.04 (0.08)
Baseline	0.09** (0.04)	0.10*** (0.02)	0.02 (0.02)	0.38*** (0.06)	0.16*** (0.02)	0.33*** (0.03)	0.09*** (0.03)	0.16*** (0.03)	0.09 (0.07)	0.33*** (0.04)	0.14*** (0.02)	0.32*** (0.03)
Observations	3,732	3,093	3,771	1,697	4,365	3,862	2,983	4,365	2,874	3,862	4,365	3,862
Control Mean: Baseline	0.94	0.71	0.83	0.23	0.87	0.42	0.79	0.86	0.71	0.32	-0.00	-0.08
Control Mean: Follow-Ups	0.97	0.85	0.89	0.28	0.88	0.56	0.80	0.87	0.51	0.38	0.00	-0.10
Control SD: Follow-Ups	0.16	0.36	0.31	0.45	0.32	0.90	0.40	0.33	0.50	0.69	1.00	0.95
Any Cash = Any Mentorship	0.19	0.00	0.77	0.85	0.46	0.97	0.88	0.71	0.03	0.61	0.22	0.61
Any Cash = Aligned	0.58	0.00	0.63	0.33	0.50	0.43	0.51	0.75	0.00	0.41	0.12	0.39
Aligned = Mixed Nat.	0.17	0.92	0.79	0.11	0.14	0.27	0.98	0.12	0.80	0.31	0.38	0.33
Aligned = Mixed Gender	0.39	0.65	0.04	0.76	0.07	0.97	0.26	0.05	0.95	0.90	0.16	0.87
Nat DiD	0.40	0.30	0.56	0.51	0.68	0.57	0.10	0.26	0.39	0.61	0.18	0.64
Gender DiD	0.48	0.27	0.19	0.78	0.12	0.47	0.20	0.22	0.31	0.26	0.73	0.26

An observation is a surveyed respondent, with one per post-baseline survey round. Results estimated through ANCOVA regression with baseline controls selected through double-lasso. Standard errors clustered at the individual level in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

C.5 Domain 5: Household Well-Being

- Total household income. This will be computed as the sum of 4 measures:
 - “What were the profits of your business during the last 30 days?”
 - “What were the profits of [any other household-owned] businesses (excluding this one) during the last 30 days?”
 - “How much wage and salary income did you earn in the last 30 days?”
 - “How much wage and salary income did [other members of your household] earn in the last 30 days?”⁹
- Total household savings, added across sources (microfinance, SACCO, bank, cash, informal, crops, mobile money, other).
- Change in total value of household durables over last 3 months, asked item-by-item, and computed as purchases – sales.
- Business capital (see D3).
- Total value of household debt (enters the index negatively), computed as the sum of debt owed to friends/neighbors, relatives, private money lenders, coops/associations, agricultural input suppliers, SACCOs, banks, microfinance organizations, NGOs, other debt, and outstanding school fees and medical bills.
- “Compared to the average Ugandan in Kampala, how would you describe the economic situation of your household? Much better, somewhat better, about the same, somewhat worse, or much worse?”
- “Over the past 7 days, how many days did someone in your household skip a meal because you didn’t have enough money for food?”
- “Over the past 30 days, how often have you or anyone in your household struggled to afford basic household expenses (such as medicine, rent, school fees)?”

⁹This includes wages paid by businesses owned by the household, which are otherwise not included in profits.

- “In the past 30 days, have you or anyone in your household had to sell assets (jewelry, furniture, clothing, tools, machines, land) in order to afford basic household expenses?”
- “How many months in the last 3 months have you not been able to pay rent for your home?”
- “If your household had an emergency that required 50,000 UGX urgently (within 3 days), would you be able to find the money?”
- Over the last 3 months, how many children in your household between the ages of 6 and 17 have missed school for at least 1 month?
- In the last 30 days, how many days did someone in your household miss work because of a physical or psychological health condition?
- “In the past 3 months, have any children in the household under the age of 15 worked because of a lack of cash for your family to meet their basic needs?”

Table C11: Domain 5a: Men

	Household Earnings	Household Savings	Change in HH Durables Value	Household Debt	Household Economic Situation	Skipped Meals	Struggled With HH Expenses	Sold Assets for HH Expenses
Any Cash	38.09*** (9.84)	48.73*** (15.03)	15.58*** (4.64)	2.95 (15.75)	0.15*** (0.03)	-0.43*** (0.10)	-0.08*** (0.02)	-0.07*** (0.03)
Basic - Aligned	1.34 (12.52)	2.75 (16.21)	-5.45 (5.49)	1.31 (19.96)	-0.01 (0.03)	0.02 (0.09)	0.01 (0.03)	-0.00 (0.03)
Basic - Mixed Gender	10.68 (14.56)	-8.35 (15.96)	-12.01** (5.78)	-19.26 (16.60)	0.03 (0.04)	-0.05 (0.09)	0.03 (0.03)	0.01 (0.03)
Basic - Mixed Nat.	36.77** (16.87)	22.94 (21.21)	8.95 (8.03)	34.46 (24.48)	0.04 (0.04)	-0.03 (0.09)	-0.02 (0.03)	0.01 (0.03)
Shared Fate - Aligned	-8.87 (16.64)	12.16 (19.50)	0.39 (7.50)	-13.12 (20.42)	0.06 (0.04)	-0.12 (0.11)	-0.02 (0.03)	-0.01 (0.03)
Shared Fate - Mixed Gender	5.91 (17.72)	-1.85 (21.63)	-14.85** (6.50)	22.02 (24.04)	-0.01 (0.04)	0.04 (0.11)	-0.01 (0.04)	0.01 (0.03)
Shared Fate - Mixed Nat.	28.27 (24.43)	48.16 (30.88)	3.11 (7.75)	14.70 (29.17)	-0.02 (0.04)	0.08 (0.13)	-0.01 (0.03)	0.03 (0.03)
Baseline	0.51*** (0.06)	0.00 (.)	0.00 (.)	0.00 (.)	0.16*** (0.02)	0.18*** (0.02)	0.18*** (0.04)	0.10*** (0.02)
Observations	3,377	3,377	3,366	3,377	3,377	3,377	3,377	3,377
Control Mean: Baseline	66.91	0.00	-99.00	0.00	0.53	1.14	0.90	0.25
Control Mean: Follow-Ups	90.49	69.29	19.46	75.48	0.56	0.98	0.89	0.21
Control SD: Follow-Ups	115.88	172.17	60.91	200.26	0.50	1.60	0.31	0.41
Any Cash = Any Mentorship	0.18	0.40	0.44	0.68	0.62	0.91	1.00	0.68
Any Cash = Aligned	0.03	0.10	0.03	0.82	0.01	0.01	0.03	0.08
Aligned = Mixed Nat.	0.02	0.14	0.09	0.15	0.78	0.65	0.45	0.37
Aligned = Mixed Gender	0.39	0.38	0.04	0.97	0.89	0.89	0.60	0.64
Nat DiD	0.96	0.69	0.36	0.90	0.04	0.18	0.38	0.55
Gender DiD	0.84	0.92	0.38	0.08	0.09	0.15	0.76	0.91

An observation is a surveyed respondent, with one per post-baseline survey round. Results estimated through ANCOVA regression with baseline controls selected through double-lasso. Standard errors clustered at the individual level in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table C12: Domain 5a: Women

	Household Earnings	Household Savings	Change in HH Durables Value	Household Debt	Household Economic Situation	Skipped Meals	Struggled With HH Expenses	Sold Assets for HH Expenses
Any Cash	15.46 (9.60)	33.82*** (11.29)	18.74*** (3.54)	-23.98** (9.91)	0.12*** (0.03)	-0.30*** (0.11)	-0.04** (0.02)	-0.06** (0.03)
Basic - Aligned	-16.40 (11.02)	-13.10 (13.27)	-8.02** (3.97)	9.36 (10.10)	-0.01 (0.04)	0.05 (0.10)	-0.02 (0.02)	0.00 (0.03)
Basic - Mixed Gender	-2.98 (10.98)	-6.25 (12.17)	-1.51 (5.29)	16.24 (13.67)	0.05 (0.04)	-0.10 (0.10)	-0.01 (0.02)	-0.02 (0.02)
Basic - Mixed Nat.	-9.34 (11.53)	-2.36 (14.94)	-5.95 (4.55)	1.45 (11.30)	0.05 (0.04)	0.06 (0.12)	-0.02 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.03)
Shared Fate - Aligned	-21.04* (11.34)	-9.64 (14.49)	-7.88 (5.26)	17.28 (16.81)	0.04 (0.04)	0.25 (0.16)	0.03 (0.02)	0.01 (0.03)
Shared Fate - Mixed Gender	-7.08 (13.10)	20.93 (20.74)	-3.63 (4.76)	18.20 (15.54)	0.01 (0.04)	-0.09 (0.12)	0.00 (0.03)	-0.02 (0.03)
Shared Fate - Mixed Nat.	-5.64 (13.35)	17.41 (18.66)	-3.54 (5.14)	16.54 (13.97)	0.10** (0.04)	-0.05 (0.12)	-0.01 (0.03)	-0.00 (0.03)
Baseline	0.39*** (0.08)	0.00 (.)	0.00 (.)	0.00 (.)	0.15*** (0.02)	0.21*** (0.02)	0.21*** (0.05)	0.15*** (0.02)
Observations	3,513	3,513	3,494	3,513	3,513	3,513	3,513	3,513
Control Mean: Baseline	53.65	0.00	-99.00	0.00	0.50	1.00	0.95	0.29
Control Mean: Follow-Ups	85.73	55.14	5.37	77.37	0.54	1.01	0.94	0.22
Control SD: Follow-Ups	130.24	124.28	51.04	158.76	0.50	1.62	0.24	0.41
Any Cash = Any Mentorship	0.19	0.92	0.11	0.12	0.16	0.92	0.53	0.68
Any Cash = Aligned	0.04	0.03	0.00	0.02	0.04	0.02	0.26	0.10
Aligned = Mixed Nat.	0.30	0.13	0.40	0.66	0.03	0.32	0.51	0.69
Aligned = Mixed Gender	0.18	0.15	0.15	0.69	0.34	0.02	0.98	0.27
Nat DiD	0.67	0.49	0.77	0.77	0.89	0.15	0.26	0.92
Gender DiD	0.98	0.32	0.77	0.81	0.12	0.34	0.25	1.00

An observation is a surveyed respondent, with one per post-baseline survey round. Results estimated through ANCOVA regression with baseline controls selected through double-lasso. Standard errors clustered at the individual level in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table C13: Domain 5b: Men

	Unable to Pay Rent	Emergency Fund Access	Children Missed School	Health Prevented Work	Any Children Working	Household Well-Being Index
Any Cash	-0.40*** (0.07)	0.16*** (0.03)	-0.08* (0.04)	0.11 (0.32)	-0.02 (0.03)	0.46*** (0.08)
Basic - Aligned	0.02 (0.07)	0.02 (0.03)	-0.03 (0.05)	-0.21 (0.32)	-0.02 (0.03)	0.01 (0.09)
Basic - Mixed Gender	0.13* (0.08)	-0.00 (0.03)	-0.01 (0.05)	-0.63** (0.31)	-0.02 (0.03)	-0.04 (0.09)
Basic - Mixed Nat.	0.12 (0.08)	0.00 (0.03)	-0.09* (0.05)	-0.08 (0.39)	-0.04 (0.03)	-0.08 (0.11)
Shared Fate - Aligned	-0.11 (0.09)	0.00 (0.03)	0.03 (0.07)	-0.53 (0.36)	-0.05 (0.03)	0.18 (0.12)
Shared Fate - Mixed Gender	0.06 (0.09)	0.01 (0.03)	-0.03 (0.05)	-0.56 (0.37)	-0.04 (0.03)	-0.07 (0.13)
Shared Fate - Mixed Nat.	0.06 (0.08)	0.01 (0.03)	0.00 (0.06)	-0.30 (0.37)	-0.04 (0.03)	-0.00 (0.12)
Baseline	0.26*** (0.02)	0.20*** (0.02)	0.11*** (0.03)	0.13*** (0.02)	0.15*** (0.04)	0.18*** (0.03)
Observations	3,340	3,357	1,741	3,359	1,741	3,377
Control Mean: Baseline	1.16	0.75	0.65	1.71	0.08	0.06
Control Mean: Follow-Ups	1.22	0.68	0.42	2.35	0.11	0.10
Control SD: Follow-Ups	1.03	0.47	0.49	4.86	0.31	1.03
Any Cash = Any Mentorship	0.28	0.67	0.45	0.15	0.10	0.87
Any Cash = Aligned	0.00	0.00	0.35	0.42	0.79	0.01
Aligned = Mixed Nat.	0.10	0.64	0.46	0.62	0.76	0.20
Aligned = Mixed Gender	0.07	0.55	0.93	0.27	0.99	0.14
Nat DiD	0.60	0.72	0.72	0.87	0.58	0.63
Gender DiD	0.66	0.57	0.45	0.44	0.92	0.23

An observation is a surveyed respondent, with one per post-baseline survey round. Results estimated through ANCOVA regression with baseline controls selected through double-lasso. Standard errors clustered at the individual level in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table C14: Domain 5b: Women

	Unable to Pay Rent	Emergency Fund Access	Children Missed School	Health Prevented Work	Any Children Working	Household Well-Being Index
Any Cash	-0.08 (0.07)	0.14*** (0.03)	0.01 (0.04)	-0.70** (0.33)	0.01 (0.02)	0.40*** (0.07)
Basic - Aligned	0.03 (0.07)	-0.03 (0.03)	-0.06 (0.04)	0.62 (0.38)	-0.01 (0.02)	-0.12 (0.07)
Basic - Mixed Gender	-0.11 (0.07)	-0.00 (0.03)	-0.07 (0.04)	-0.10 (0.39)	0.01 (0.03)	0.01 (0.08)
Basic - Mixed Nat.	-0.07 (0.08)	0.03 (0.04)	-0.01 (0.05)	0.20 (0.40)	-0.03 (0.03)	0.02 (0.08)
Shared Fate - Aligned	0.12 (0.11)	-0.04 (0.04)	-0.14*** (0.05)	0.85* (0.51)	-0.03 (0.03)	-0.37*** (0.10)
Shared Fate - Mixed Gender	-0.06 (0.10)	0.02 (0.04)	-0.03 (0.05)	-0.36 (0.39)	0.03 (0.03)	-0.03 (0.09)
Shared Fate - Mixed Nat.	-0.01 (0.09)	0.02 (0.03)	-0.03 (0.04)	1.33** (0.56)	0.01 (0.03)	-0.09 (0.09)
Baseline	0.28*** (0.02)	0.18*** (0.02)	0.12*** (0.03)	0.12*** (0.03)	0.24*** (0.04)	0.13*** (0.02)
Observations	3,468	3,481	2,645	3,492	2,645	3,513
Control Mean: Baseline	1.44	0.59	0.52	3.30	0.12	-0.06
Control Mean: Follow-Ups	1.20	0.62	0.41	3.41	0.10	-0.10
Control SD: Follow-Ups	1.07	0.49	0.49	5.85	0.30	0.96
Any Cash = Any Mentorship	0.69	0.97	0.12	0.12	0.90	0.16
Any Cash = Aligned	0.26	0.00	0.12	0.01	0.54	0.00
Aligned = Mixed Nat.	0.14	0.06	0.05	0.91	0.98	0.01
Aligned = Mixed Gender	0.03	0.19	0.29	0.01	0.17	0.01
Nat DiD	0.89	0.88	0.43	0.29	0.16	0.32
Gender DiD	0.81	0.63	0.14	0.49	0.46	0.14

An observation is a surveyed respondent, with one per post-baseline survey round. Results estimated through ANCOVA regression with baseline controls selected through double-lasso. Standard errors clustered at the individual level in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

C.6 Domain 6: Women's Bargaining Power

- Decision-making power in household spending decisions (ranked from most to least, with “not applicables” in the middle, then treated as a Likert)
- Has input in decision to work
- Has input in type of work
- Has input in childbearing
- Has input in children's education decisions
- An indicator for whether male adults are ranked strictly above female adults in the order that household members eat when food is in short supply (enters negatively).
- “In your opinion, is a husband justified in hitting or beating his wife if she burns the food?” (enters negatively)
- “In your opinion, is a husband justified in hitting or beating his wife if she neglects the children?” (enters negatively)

Table C15: Domain 6: Men

	HH Spending Decision Power	Decision to Work Input	Type of Work Input	Having Children Input	Children's Education Input	Men Above Women in Food Order	Violence Justified Food	Violence Justified Neglect	Women's Bargaining Power Index
Any Cash	0.24** (0.11)	-0.02 (0.03)	-0.03 (0.03)	-0.05 (0.03)	-0.04 (0.03)	0.05 (0.04)	0.00 (0.01)	0.00 (0.01)	-0.10 (0.07)
Basic - Aligned	-0.14 (0.12)	0.03 (0.03)	0.04 (0.03)	0.03 (0.04)	0.03 (0.03)	-0.05 (0.04)	0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	0.11 (0.07)
Basic - Mixed Gender	-0.24** (0.12)	-0.01 (0.03)	0.01 (0.03)	0.02 (0.04)	0.05 (0.03)	-0.01 (0.05)	0.00 (0.01)	0.00 (0.01)	0.02 (0.08)
Basic - Mixed Nat.	0.01 (0.15)	0.06** (0.03)	0.06* (0.03)	-0.00 (0.04)	0.02 (0.04)	-0.05 (0.05)	0.00 (0.01)	0.00 (0.01)	0.16** (0.08)
Shared Fate - Aligned	-0.26* (0.15)	0.02 (0.03)	0.05 (0.04)	0.06 (0.04)	0.08* (0.04)	-0.06 (0.06)	-0.02*** (0.01)	-0.02*** (0.01)	0.13 (0.10)
Shared Fate - Mixed Gender	-0.29* (0.15)	-0.00 (0.03)	0.01 (0.03)	0.02 (0.04)	-0.02 (0.04)	-0.09 (0.06)	0.00 (0.01)	0.00 (0.01)	0.07 (0.08)
Shared Fate - Mixed Nat.	-0.30* (0.15)	-0.01 (0.04)	0.00 (0.04)	-0.05 (0.04)	0.01 (0.04)	-0.03 (0.05)	-0.00 (0.01)	-0.00 (0.01)	0.02 (0.09)
Baseline	0.20*** (0.03)	0.11*** (0.03)	0.10*** (0.02)	0.13*** (0.03)	0.12*** (0.03)	0.19*** (0.05)	0.04 (0.04)	0.04 (0.04)	0.16*** (0.03)
Observations	2,988	2,988	2,988	2,528	2,528	1,716	3,188	3,188	2,988
Control Mean: Baseline	2.54	0.64	0.67	0.57	0.62	0.25	0.01	0.01	0.03
Control Mean: Follow-Ups	2.50	0.78	0.79	0.69	0.72	0.28	0.01	0.01	-0.10
Control SD: Follow-Ups	1.50	0.41	0.41	0.46	0.45	0.45	0.11	0.11	1.06
Any Cash = Any Mentorship	0.04	0.49	0.21	0.72	0.29	0.24	0.79	0.79	0.13
Any Cash = Aligned	0.03	0.26	0.10	0.13	0.12	0.21	0.91	0.91	0.08
Aligned = Mixed Nat.	0.64	0.95	0.80	0.07	0.36	0.84	0.67	0.67	0.83
Aligned = Mixed Gender	0.47	0.18	0.17	0.51	0.35	0.90	0.60	0.60	0.25
Nat DiD	0.44	0.31	0.21	0.24	0.39	0.71	0.11	0.11	0.24
Gender DiD	0.75	0.70	0.82	0.65	0.08	0.37	0.03	0.03	0.81

An observation is a surveyed respondent, with one per post-baseline survey round. Results estimated through ANCOVA regression with baseline controls selected through double-lasso. Standard errors clustered at the individual level in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table C16: Domain 6: Women

	HH Spending Decision Power	Decision to Work Input	Type of Work Input	Having Children Input	Children's Education Input	Men Above Women in Food Order	Violence Justified Food	Violence Justified Neglect	Women's Bargaining Power Index
Any Cash	-0.16 (0.12)	0.01 (0.03)	0.00 (0.03)	0.03 (0.03)	0.02 (0.03)	0.02 (0.04)	0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.07)
Basic - Aligned	0.03 (0.12)	-0.01 (0.03)	-0.00 (0.03)	-0.01 (0.03)	-0.03 (0.03)	-0.06 (0.05)	-0.00 (0.01)	-0.00 (0.01)	0.02 (0.07)
Basic - Mixed Gender	-0.04 (0.12)	0.02 (0.03)	0.02 (0.03)	-0.02 (0.03)	-0.02 (0.03)	-0.07 (0.05)	0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	0.08 (0.07)
Basic - Mixed Nat.	-0.07 (0.13)	-0.03 (0.03)	-0.01 (0.03)	-0.00 (0.03)	-0.00 (0.03)	-0.05 (0.05)	-0.00 (0.01)	-0.00 (0.01)	0.01 (0.08)
Shared Fate - Aligned	-0.07 (0.17)	0.04 (0.04)	0.03 (0.03)	0.01 (0.04)	0.01 (0.04)	-0.02 (0.06)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	0.10 (0.09)
Shared Fate - Mixed Gender	0.00 (0.16)	0.01 (0.03)	0.01 (0.03)	-0.02 (0.04)	-0.03 (0.04)	-0.09 (0.06)	0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	0.07 (0.08)
Shared Fate - Mixed Nat.	0.02 (0.14)	0.04 (0.04)	0.01 (0.04)	0.05 (0.03)	0.05 (0.03)	-0.01 (0.06)	-0.00 (0.01)	-0.00 (0.01)	0.12 (0.09)
Baseline	0.27*** (0.03)	0.10*** (0.02)	0.10*** (0.02)	0.09*** (0.02)	0.08*** (0.02)	0.24*** (0.04)	0.11** (0.05)	0.11** (0.05)	0.15*** (0.02)
Observations	3,406	3,406	3,406	3,205	3,205	1,774	3,460	3,460	3,406
Control Mean: Baseline	2.59	0.58	0.62	0.56	0.57	0.45	0.02	0.02	0.02
Control Mean: Follow-Ups	2.72	0.74	0.76	0.71	0.71	0.40	0.01	0.01	-0.09
Control SD: Follow-Ups	1.69	0.44	0.43	0.46	0.46	0.49	0.11	0.11	1.05
Any Cash = Any Mentorship	0.84	0.62	0.70	0.96	0.68	0.12	0.93	0.93	0.28
Any Cash = Aligned	0.41	0.96	0.90	0.54	0.44	0.31	0.33	0.33	0.74
Aligned = Mixed Nat.	0.76	0.77	0.71	0.46	0.27	0.76	0.67	0.67	0.91
Aligned = Mixed Gender	0.83	0.65	0.83	0.51	0.62	0.53	0.12	0.12	0.63
Nat DiD	0.42	0.67	0.81	0.67	0.82	0.94	0.56	0.56	0.84
Gender DiD	0.54	0.32	0.40	0.62	0.42	0.53	0.56	0.56	0.50

An observation is a surveyed respondent, with one per post-baseline survey round. Results estimated through ANCOVA regression with baseline controls selected through double-lasso. Standard errors clustered at the individual level in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

C.7 Domain 7: Psychological Well-Being

- “In the past month, how much of the time were you a happy person?”
- “In the past month, how much of the time did you feel calm and peaceful?”
- “In the past month, how much of the time did you feel down-hearted and sad?”

Table C17: Domain 7: Men

	Happy At Least Sometimes	Calm/Peaceful At Least Sometimes	Down/Sad At Least Sometimes	Psychological Well-Being Index
Any Cash	0.12*** (0.03)	0.08*** (0.03)	-0.10*** (0.03)	0.27*** (0.07)
Basic - Aligned	-0.04 (0.03)	-0.01 (0.03)	0.02 (0.03)	-0.06 (0.08)
Basic - Mixed Gender	-0.04 (0.04)	-0.04 (0.04)	0.00 (0.04)	-0.07 (0.09)
Basic - Mixed Nat.	0.01 (0.04)	0.04 (0.04)	-0.02 (0.04)	0.06 (0.08)
Shared Fate - Aligned	0.04 (0.05)	0.02 (0.04)	-0.04 (0.04)	0.09 (0.10)
Shared Fate - Mixed Gender	0.01 (0.04)	0.01 (0.04)	-0.01 (0.04)	0.03 (0.09)
Shared Fate - Mixed Nat.	-0.02 (0.04)	0.01 (0.04)	-0.00 (0.04)	-0.01 (0.09)
Baseline	0.20*** (0.02)	0.05 (0.04)	0.13*** (0.02)	0.23*** (0.02)
Observations	3,370	3,377	3,371	3,377
Control Mean: Baseline	0.36	0.35	0.50	0.05
Control Mean: Follow-Ups	0.31	0.32	0.57	0.07
Control SD: Follow-Ups	0.46	0.47	0.49	1.01
Any Cash = Any Mentorship	0.58	0.96	0.90	0.88
Any Cash = Aligned	0.01	0.09	0.06	0.01
Aligned = Mixed Nat.	0.74	0.30	0.77	0.51
Aligned = Mixed Gender	0.88	0.70	0.97	0.81
Nat DiD	0.18	0.36	0.31	0.14
Gender DiD	0.69	0.81	0.60	0.75

An observation is a surveyed respondent, with one per post-baseline survey round. Results estimated through ANCOVA regression with baseline controls selected through double-lasso. Standard errors clustered at the individual level in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table C18: Domain 7: Women

	Happy At Least Sometimes	Calm/Peaceful At Least Sometimes	Down/Sad At Least Sometimes	Psychological Well-Being Index
Any Cash	0.11*** (0.03)	0.11*** (0.03)	-0.10*** (0.03)	0.29*** (0.06)
Basic - Aligned	-0.03 (0.03)	-0.04 (0.03)	0.02 (0.03)	-0.08 (0.07)
Basic - Mixed Gender	0.01 (0.04)	0.00 (0.04)	0.01 (0.04)	0.00 (0.08)
Basic - Mixed Nat.	-0.01 (0.04)	0.00 (0.04)	-0.03 (0.04)	0.03 (0.08)
Shared Fate - Aligned	-0.08** (0.04)	-0.07* (0.04)	0.06 (0.04)	-0.18** (0.08)
Shared Fate - Mixed Gender	-0.01 (0.04)	-0.02 (0.04)	0.02 (0.04)	-0.06 (0.09)
Shared Fate - Mixed Nat.	-0.01 (0.05)	-0.05 (0.04)	-0.02 (0.04)	-0.03 (0.10)
Baseline	0.18*** (0.02)	0.11*** (0.02)	0.13*** (0.02)	0.21*** (0.02)
Observations	3,509	3,509	3,508	3,512
Control Mean: Baseline	0.33	0.32	0.53	-0.03
Control Mean: Follow-Ups	0.29	0.25	0.61	-0.03
Control SD: Follow-Ups	0.46	0.43	0.49	0.97
Any Cash = Any Mentorship	0.47	0.33	0.76	0.40
Any Cash = Aligned	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.00
Aligned = Mixed Nat.	0.23	0.26	0.05	0.09
Aligned = Mixed Gender	0.08	0.15	0.50	0.16
Nat DiD	0.47	0.67	0.68	0.80
Gender DiD	0.80	0.98	0.60	0.84

An observation is a surveyed respondent, with one per post-baseline survey round. Results estimated through ANCOVA regression with baseline controls selected through double-lasso. Standard errors clustered at the individual level in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

C.8 Domain 8: Social Proximity for Refugees

- “How connected do you feel with Uganda?”
- States that they plan on living in Uganda in the future.
- “How often do you feel isolated from Ugandan society?”
- “In the last 12 months, how often did you eat dinner with Ugandans who are not part of your family?”
- Participates with Ugandans in job-related groups.
- Participates with Ugandans in other hobbies.
- Participates with Ugandans in religious groups.
- “In the last 12 months, how often have you provided such everyday favors to Ugandans, such as lending items, borrowing a little money, or watching children?”
- “In Uganda, how difficult or easy would it be for you to see a doctor?”
- “In Uganda, how difficult or easy would it be for you to search for a job with a salary?”
- “In Uganda, how difficult or easy would it be for you to get help with legal problem?”

Table C19: Domain 8: Ugandans

	Feels Connected w/ UG	Continue Living in UG	Feels Isolated in UG	Eats w/ Ugandans Outside Fam	Participates w/Ugandans Job Grps	Participates w/Ugandans Hobbies	Participates w/Ugandans Religious Grps	Everyday Favors for Ugandans	Difficult to See a Doctor	Difficult to Get Salaried Job	Difficult to Get Legal Help	Social Proximity Index
Any Cash	-0.00 (0.03)	-0.01 (0.03)	-0.04 (0.03)	0.06** (0.03)	0.01 (0.04)	0.00 (0.04)	0.03 (0.03)	0.04 (0.03)	-0.03 (0.03)	-0.00 (0.02)	-0.03 (0.02)	0.13* (0.07)
Basic - Aligned	-0.00 (0.03)	-0.05 (0.03)	0.03 (0.03)	-0.00 (0.03)	-0.02 (0.04)	0.00 (0.04)	-0.04 (0.04)	-0.03 (0.03)	-0.03 (0.03)	-0.02 (0.02)	-0.02 (0.03)	-0.05 (0.07)
Basic - Mixed Gender	0.04 (0.03)	-0.04 (0.04)	0.10*** (0.03)	0.03 (0.03)	-0.03 (0.04)	-0.06 (0.05)	-0.01 (0.03)	0.05 (0.03)	0.03 (0.03)	-0.02 (0.02)	0.03 (0.02)	-0.02 (0.08)
Basic - Mixed Nat.	0.05 (0.03)	0.02 (0.04)	0.02 (0.03)	-0.01 (0.03)	0.00 (0.04)	0.01 (0.05)	-0.02 (0.04)	0.04 (0.03)	-0.03 (0.04)	-0.03 (0.02)	-0.04 (0.03)	0.10 (0.08)
Shared Fate - Aligned	0.07** (0.04)	-0.01 (0.04)	-0.01 (0.03)	-0.05 (0.04)	-0.12** (0.05)	-0.06 (0.05)	-0.02 (0.04)	-0.01 (0.04)	-0.03 (0.04)	-0.01 (0.02)	-0.02 (0.03)	-0.03 (0.09)
Shared Fate - Mixed Gender	0.01 (0.04)	-0.06 (0.04)	0.03 (0.03)	-0.05 (0.04)	0.03 (0.05)	0.04 (0.05)	0.05 (0.04)	-0.03 (0.04)	0.04 (0.04)	0.02 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.03)	-0.10 (0.09)
Shared Fate - Mixed Nat.	0.04 (0.04)	0.01 (0.04)	0.04 (0.03)	-0.01 (0.04)	-0.00 (0.04)	-0.04 (0.06)	-0.05 (0.04)	0.01 (0.04)	0.00 (0.04)	0.01 (0.02)	-0.00 (0.03)	-0.05 (0.09)
Baseline	0.20*** (0.02)	0.27*** (0.03)	0.10*** (0.02)	0.09*** (0.02)	0.17*** (0.04)	0.15*** (0.03)	0.14*** (0.03)	0.15*** (0.02)	0.22*** (0.02)	0.04* (0.02)	0.13*** (0.02)	0.20*** (0.02)
Observations	4,678	4,653	4,678	4,678	2,121	1,883	2,811	4,678	4,678	4,678	4,678	4,678
Control Mean: Baseline	0.78	0.26	0.30	0.67	0.72	0.66	0.68	0.74	0.69	0.92	0.83	-0.00
Control Mean: Follow-Ups	0.70	0.40	0.27	0.54	0.75	0.73	0.74	0.61	0.69	0.93	0.83	0.00
Control SD: Follow-Ups	0.46	0.49	0.44	0.50	0.44	0.45	0.44	0.49	0.46	0.26	0.38	1.00
Any Cash = Any Mentorship	0.22	0.38	0.09	0.60	0.50	0.60	0.57	0.92	0.82	0.46	0.56	0.72
Any Cash = Aligned	0.60	0.58	0.26	0.11	0.38	0.77	0.28	0.22	0.99	0.63	0.92	0.16
Aligned = Mixed Nat.	0.41	0.05	0.56	0.69	0.13	0.87	0.75	0.07	0.52	0.86	0.82	0.21
Aligned = Mixed Gender	0.94	0.79	0.03	0.55	0.20	0.96	0.07	0.12	0.02	0.35	0.12	0.89
Nat DiD	0.10	0.41	0.23	0.33	0.21	0.91	0.43	0.35	0.58	0.19	0.44	0.20
Gender DiD	0.05	0.27	0.60	0.57	0.04	0.02	0.46	0.06	0.81	0.25	0.25	0.41

An observation is a surveyed respondent, with one per post-baseline survey round. Results estimated through ANCOVA regression with baseline controls selected through double-lasso. Standard errors clustered at the individual level in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table C20: Domain 8: Refugees

	Feels Connected w/ UG	Continue Living in UG	Feels Isolated in UG	Eats w/ Ugandans Outside Fam	Participates w/Ugandans Job Grps	Participates w/Ugandans Hobbies	Participates w/Ugandans Religious Grps	Everyday Favors for Ugandans	Difficult to See a Doctor	Difficult to Get Salaried Job	Difficult to Get Legal Help	Social Proximity Index
Any Cash	-0.01 (0.03)	0.00 (0.01)	-0.02 (0.03)	-0.02 (0.03)	-0.01 (0.04)	0.04 (0.04)	0.05 (0.03)	0.01 (0.03)	-0.05 (0.03)	-0.03** (0.02)	-0.02 (0.03)	0.04 (0.06)
Basic - Aligned	0.01 (0.03)	-0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.03)	0.03 (0.03)	-0.02 (0.05)	-0.05 (0.05)	-0.03 (0.04)	0.02 (0.03)	0.02 (0.03)	0.02 (0.02)	-0.04 (0.03)	0.04 (0.06)
Basic - Mixed Gender	-0.03 (0.03)	0.01 (0.02)	0.04 (0.03)	0.01 (0.03)	-0.03 (0.05)	-0.09 (0.05)	-0.04 (0.04)	0.00 (0.03)	-0.03 (0.03)	0.01 (0.02)	-0.02 (0.03)	-0.02 (0.07)
Basic - Mixed Nat.	0.01 (0.03)	0.00 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.03)	0.03 (0.04)	-0.08* (0.05)	0.00 (0.05)	-0.05 (0.04)	0.01 (0.03)	-0.02 (0.04)	0.03 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.03)	0.05 (0.07)
Shared Fate - Aligned	0.02 (0.04)	-0.01 (0.02)	0.06 (0.04)	0.03 (0.04)	0.04 (0.06)	0.01 (0.07)	-0.02 (0.05)	-0.03 (0.04)	-0.00 (0.04)	0.03 (0.02)	-0.02 (0.04)	-0.04 (0.09)
Shared Fate - Mixed Gender	-0.00 (0.04)	-0.01 (0.02)	0.02 (0.04)	0.01 (0.04)	-0.05 (0.06)	-0.06 (0.07)	-0.09* (0.05)	0.03 (0.04)	0.00 (0.04)	-0.02 (0.02)	0.03 (0.04)	-0.05 (0.08)
Shared Fate - Mixed Nat.	0.00 (0.04)	0.01 (0.02)	0.00 (0.04)	0.05 (0.04)	-0.05 (0.05)	0.04 (0.06)	-0.03 (0.04)	0.03 (0.04)	0.03 (0.03)	0.01 (0.02)	0.02 (0.04)	0.01 (0.08)
Baseline	0.10*** (0.02)	0.18*** (0.05)	0.10*** (0.02)	0.08*** (0.02)	0.12*** (0.04)	0.29*** (0.04)	0.26*** (0.03)	0.04** (0.02)	0.19*** (0.02)	0.13*** (0.02)	0.14*** (0.02)	0.22*** (0.02)
Observations	4,365	4,294	4,365	4,365	1,774	1,377	3,049	4,365	4,365	4,365	4,365	4,365
Control Mean: Baseline	0.30	0.05	0.54	0.50	0.51	0.53	0.40	0.63	0.66	0.91	0.68	-0.00
Control Mean: Follow-Ups	0.31	0.05	0.57	0.52	0.38	0.40	0.32	0.59	0.69	0.92	0.70	0.00
Control SD: Follow-Ups	0.46	0.22	0.50	0.50	0.49	0.49	0.47	0.49	0.46	0.27	0.46	1.00
Any Cash = Any Mentorship	0.99	0.97	0.49	0.24	0.31	0.46	0.17	0.57	0.98	0.39	0.66	0.92
Any Cash = Aligned	0.56	0.65	0.33	0.29	0.98	0.36	0.23	0.99	0.26	0.08	0.86	0.82
Aligned = Mixed Nat.	0.73	0.24	0.24	0.70	0.08	0.31	0.68	0.55	0.67	0.99	0.24	0.60
Aligned = Mixed Gender	0.13	0.55	0.97	0.36	0.29	0.25	0.32	0.84	0.39	0.16	0.19	0.37
Nat DiD	0.87	0.76	0.52	0.73	0.67	0.81	0.95	0.18	0.19	0.30	0.94	0.74
Gender DiD	0.60	0.49	0.28	0.99	0.35	0.79	0.39	0.15	0.34	0.30	0.73	0.66

An observation is a surveyed respondent, with one per post-baseline survey round. Results estimated through ANCOVA regression with baseline controls selected through double-lasso. Standard errors clustered at the individual level in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

C.9 Domain 9: Beliefs about economic effects of refugees

- “How do the [sector] businesses managed by people from other countries affect your business overall? Do they help you a lot, help you a little, hurt you a little, hurt you a lot, or have no effect on you?”
- “Taking everything into consideration, would you say the overall economic effect of refugees on Uganda has been positive, negative, or neutral?”
- “How about the overall economic effect of refugees on you personally?”
- “How many refugees have skills and contribute to the economy?”

Table C21: Domain 9: Ugandans

	Effect of Other Nat. Managers	Positive Econ. Effects of Refugees	Positive Indiv. Effects of Refugees	Refugees Contribute to the Economy	Economic Effect of Refugees Index
Any Cash	0.06* (0.04)	0.06** (0.03)	0.09*** (0.03)	-0.02 (0.03)	0.13** (0.06)
Basic - Aligned	-0.02 (0.04)	-0.03 (0.03)	-0.03 (0.03)	0.01 (0.03)	-0.03 (0.07)
Basic - Mixed Gender	-0.04 (0.04)	0.00 (0.03)	0.00 (0.03)	0.03 (0.03)	0.01 (0.07)
Basic - Mixed Nat.	0.00 (0.04)	0.03 (0.03)	0.03 (0.03)	0.03 (0.03)	0.10 (0.07)
Shared Fate - Aligned	0.00 (0.04)	0.03 (0.04)	0.00 (0.03)	0.04 (0.04)	0.07 (0.08)
Shared Fate - Mixed Gender	0.01 (0.04)	-0.00 (0.04)	-0.01 (0.03)	0.01 (0.04)	-0.01 (0.08)
Shared Fate - Mixed Nat.	-0.01 (0.04)	-0.01 (0.04)	-0.00 (0.04)	0.06 (0.04)	0.04 (0.08)
Baseline	0.08*** (0.03)	0.12*** (0.02)	0.14*** (0.02)	0.14*** (0.02)	0.13*** (0.02)
Observations	3,197	4,508	4,581	4,478	4,671
Control Mean: Baseline	0.49	0.65	0.58	0.58	-0.00
Control Mean: Follow-Ups	0.52	0.61	0.62	0.65	0.00
Control SD: Follow-Ups	0.50	0.49	0.48	0.48	1.00
Any Cash = Any Mentorship	0.69	0.96	0.86	0.29	0.65
Any Cash = Aligned	0.22	0.13	0.02	0.40	0.23
Aligned = Mixed Nat.	0.67	0.28	0.17	0.41	0.20
Aligned = Mixed Gender	0.84	0.57	0.57	0.98	1.00
Nat DiD	0.55	0.06	0.20	0.96	0.16
Gender DiD	0.80	0.24	0.34	0.32	0.32

An observation is a surveyed respondent, with one per post-baseline survey round. Results estimated through ANCOVA regression with baseline controls selected through double-lasso. Standard errors clustered at the individual level in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table C22: Domain 9: Refugees

	Effect of Other Nat. Managers	Refugees Contribute to the Economy	Economic Effect of Refugees Index
Any Cash	-0.01 (0.03)	-0.01 (0.02)	-0.05 (0.06)
Basic - Aligned	-0.05 (0.03)	-0.00 (0.03)	-0.01 (0.06)
Basic - Mixed Gender	-0.00 (0.04)	0.05* (0.03)	0.13** (0.06)
Basic - Mixed Nat.	0.06 (0.03)	0.03 (0.03)	0.12** (0.06)
Shared Fate - Aligned	-0.03 (0.04)	-0.02 (0.03)	-0.03 (0.07)
Shared Fate - Mixed Gender	-0.01 (0.04)	0.06* (0.03)	0.12 (0.08)
Shared Fate - Mixed Nat.	0.04 (0.04)	-0.00 (0.03)	0.08 (0.08)
Baseline	0.13*** (0.02)	0.08*** (0.02)	0.05*** (0.02)
Observations	3,582	4,076	4,301
Control Mean: Baseline	0.49	0.77	0.00
Control Mean: Follow-Ups	0.55	0.76	0.00
Control SD: Follow-Ups	0.50	0.43	1.00
Any Cash = Any Mentorship	0.99	0.35	0.14
Any Cash = Aligned	0.61	1.00	0.70
Aligned = Mixed Nat.	0.00	0.25	0.01
Aligned = Mixed Gender	0.24	0.01	0.01
Nat DiD	0.53	0.86	0.87
Gender DiD	0.64	0.60	0.91

An observation is a surveyed respondent, with one per post-baseline survey round. Results estimated through ANCOVA regression with baseline controls selected through double-lasso. Standard errors clustered at the individual level in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

C.10 Domain 10: Support for inclusive refugee hosting.

- “Refugees in Uganda should be required to live in the settlements. Refugees should not be allowed to live in Kampala.”
- “Refugees in Uganda should not be allowed to work outside the settlements.”
- “Uganda should not provide land for farming to refugees in the settlements.”
- “Refugees in Uganda should not be allowed to vote in Uganda or become full Ugandan citizens.”
- “Uganda should not accept more refugees.”

Table C23: Domain 10: Ugandans

	Let Refugees Live Outside Settlements	Let Refugees Work Outside Settlements	Provide Refugees Land	Let Refugees Vote/Be Citizens	Accept More Refugees	Refugee Support Index
Any Cash	0.06*** (0.02)	0.07*** (0.02)	0.07*** (0.02)	0.05* (0.03)	0.08*** (0.02)	0.23*** (0.06)
Basic - Aligned	-0.00 (0.02)	-0.03 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.02)	-0.05 (0.03)	-0.02 (0.02)	-0.07 (0.06)
Basic - Mixed Gender	0.00 (0.02)	-0.02 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.02)	-0.04 (0.03)	-0.03 (0.02)	-0.07 (0.06)
Basic - Mixed Nat.	-0.01 (0.03)	-0.02 (0.02)	-0.05** (0.02)	-0.03 (0.04)	-0.05* (0.03)	-0.12* (0.07)
Shared Fate - Aligned	-0.07** (0.03)	-0.04* (0.02)	-0.04 (0.03)	-0.07** (0.04)	-0.07** (0.03)	-0.19** (0.07)
Shared Fate - Mixed Gender	0.00 (0.03)	-0.03 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.02)	-0.02 (0.04)	-0.02 (0.03)	-0.05 (0.07)
Shared Fate - Mixed Nat.	0.01 (0.03)	-0.03 (0.03)	-0.05** (0.02)	-0.06 (0.04)	-0.01 (0.03)	-0.10 (0.07)
Baseline	0.09*** (0.02)	0.10*** (0.03)	0.08*** (0.02)	0.17*** (0.03)	0.12*** (0.02)	0.16*** (0.02)
Observations	4,672	4,672	4,672	4,678	4,678	4,678
Control Mean: Baseline	0.85	0.89	0.82	0.83	0.78	-0.01
Control Mean: Follow-Ups	0.79	0.83	0.83	0.63	0.77	0.00
Control SD: Follow-Ups	0.41	0.37	0.37	0.48	0.42	1.00
Any Cash = Any Mentorship	0.56	0.06	0.09	0.06	0.07	0.03
Any Cash = Aligned	0.03	0.00	0.01	0.04	0.00	0.00
Aligned = Mixed Nat.	0.29	0.46	0.14	0.59	0.93	1.00
Aligned = Mixed Gender	0.16	0.65	0.41	0.34	0.60	0.35
Nat DiD	0.06	0.94	0.47	0.99	0.05	0.24
Gender DiD	0.13	0.82	0.43	0.44	0.20	0.20

An observation is a surveyed respondent, with one per post-baseline survey round. Results estimated through ANCOVA regression with baseline controls selected through double-lasso. Standard errors clustered at the individual level in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table C24: Domain 10: Refugees

	Let Refugees Vote/Be Citizens	Accept More Refugees	Refugee Support Index
Any Cash	0.02 (0.03)	-0.03 (0.03)	-0.02 (0.06)
Basic - Aligned	-0.05 (0.03)	0.05* (0.03)	0.01 (0.06)
Basic - Mixed Gender	-0.04 (0.03)	0.04 (0.03)	-0.00 (0.06)
Basic - Mixed Nat.	0.01 (0.03)	0.07** (0.03)	0.12* (0.06)
Shared Fate - Aligned	-0.03 (0.04)	0.02 (0.04)	-0.01 (0.07)
Shared Fate - Mixed Gender	-0.05 (0.04)	0.06* (0.04)	0.02 (0.08)
Shared Fate - Mixed Nat.	-0.00 (0.03)	0.05 (0.04)	0.09 (0.07)
Baseline	0.03* (0.02)	5.19*** (0.47)	0.13*** (0.02)
Observations	4,365	4,365	4,365
Control Mean: Baseline	0.48	0.77	-0.01
Control Mean: Follow-Ups	0.31	0.65	0.00
Control SD: Follow-Ups	0.46	0.48	1.00
Any Cash = Any Mentorship	0.25	0.04	0.45
Any Cash = Aligned	0.20	0.16	0.83
Aligned = Mixed Nat.	0.06	0.39	0.04
Aligned = Mixed Gender	0.85	0.86	0.97
Nat DiD	0.55	0.87	0.83
Gender DiD	0.64	0.33	0.76

An observation is a surveyed respondent, with one per post-baseline survey round. Results estimated through ANCOVA regression with baseline controls selected through double-lasso. Standard errors clustered at the individual level in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.